East Asia Commentary

South Korean Views of North Korea and the U.S.

2011-02-10T20:51:00.000-08:00

Today the USC Korean Studies Institute published an interview I did regarding South Korean public opinion.

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A recent survey suggests that 70 percent of South Koreans would root for North Korea in a soccer match against the United States. What does this say about South Korean public opinion, even as Seoul and Washington cooperate in dealing with Pyongyang?

I always find the hypothetical soccer match question interesting, especially after experiencing the 2002 World Cup in Korea. But I think the question is a poor proxy for measuring trends relevant to foreign policy. Rooting for the North Korean soccer team is a near costless way for South Koreans to express ethnic nationalism. Korea has long been a painfully divided nation, so emotions are involved when South Koreans watch North Korean soccer, and this real-life drama sells well in the media. What is more, one might root for the North Korean footballers and sympathize with the North Korean people, but detest the regime in Pyongyang. One might also have an affinity for the U.S. but care little about the American soccer team. So I don’t think South Korean support of North Korean footballers says much about political or economic willingness to engage the North, the desire for unification, or the level of support for Pyongyang vs. Washington.

So does the soccer question have any real political significance?

Sport can be a factor as well as a reflection of national identity. Major sports events can capture or even help define the public mood for a time. Sports heroes, controversies and analogies can affect politics, and politics often surrounds sport, as with the Beijing Olympics. The ethnic nationalism often expressed in soccer also shapes South Korean views of the North, as well as South Korean views of how other countries relate to Pyongyang. But we should not read too much into South Korean allegiances in a hypothetical soccer match. How often do the U.S. and North Korean teams actually face each other on the pitch? A less hypothetical situation involves how South Koreans tend to root for whichever team is playing Japan. So perhaps a more interesting question – given recent events – would be the balance of South Korean support in a Japan vs. China match. It would also be interesting to see if South Koreans would be less supportive of the North Korean team if it started to outperform the South in international competition. Pan-Korean nationalism may be a powerful force among soccer fans, but I suspect South Korean nationalism is quite a bit stronger.

Isn’t there a tendency in South Korea to frame the nuclear standoff as a North Korea vs. U.S. issue? And don’t some South Koreans like to see the North stand up to America?

South Koreans know their government is not a spectator but an interested and involved actor in the nuclear standoff. While South Koreans are generally desensitized to North Korean threats and see outright war as improbable, they are still conscious that the situation can become one of life and death or involve potential shocks for the South Korean economy and taxpayer. There is little doubt that nuclear weapons are important to North Korean nationalism and a desire to stand up to the U.S. (and China, for that matter). Some South Koreans say that pursuing nuclear weapons makes sense for Pyongyang, given its external threat perceptions and how its conventional military forces are outmatched by those of South Korea and the U.S. But trying to understand or even justify North Korean behavior is not the same as supporting it. South Koreans are increasingly critical of the North since Pyongyang apparently tested two nuclear devices, cheated on the nonproliferation regime and Six-party Talks agreements, and attacked South Korea. The general sense in South Korea is that Pyongyang’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is a misuse of resources by a Kim family regime that antagonizes outsiders and traps the North Korean people in oppressive poverty.

Does this mean Americans do not have cause to worry about South Korean public opinion?

Sympathies among South Koreans for the North remain significant and important, and some historical suspicion and resentment of the U.S. endures. So it would be imprudent for Americans to interpret the Lee Myung-bak government’s very positive orientation toward the U.S. and relatively tough stance on North Korea as a consensus opinion. Future developments with the North, and especially within South Korea’s domestic politics, might produce a shift in foreign policy. A major lesson of the early 2000s was that the U.S. needs to better understand South Korean pride and ethnic nationalism. That lesson is being reflected in improvements in handling incidents involving U.S. forces in South Korea, care to avoid unilateral policies on North Korea, and calls for progress in relations between Seoul and Pyongyang before the U.S. seriously reengages with the North.

Has the sinking of South Korea’s Cheonan naval vessel and North Korea’s shelling of Yeonpyeong Island fundamentally changed South Korean views of the North?

Certainly those attacks hardened South Korean public opinion in the short-term. But it is yet unclear whether the Cheonan and Yeonpyeongdo incidents will affect South Korean opinions over the long-term as much as the June 15, 2000 North-South summit and the Sunshine Policy. Many Koreans are likely to view recent events as confirmation of what they already believe. Ultra-conservatives assert that North Korea’s regime is a threat and must be defeated; ultra-progressives assert that the Lee Myung-bak administration and the U.S. pushed North Korea into a corner and thus provoked violence. The young generation is more susceptible to recent events as formative experiences, but it is too soon to tell how Cheonanham and Yeonpyeongdo will shape their views.

We often hear that young South Koreans are focused on jobs and see the situation with North Korea as out of their hands. Do they tend to be aloof to Pyongyang’s provocations?

New survey-based research in South Korea suggests that the young generation cares about socio-economic issues more than the ideological divides of previous generations who experienced the Korean War and democratization. South Koreans in their 20s and 30s appear very pragmatic about North Korea and the U.S., focusing on how foreign relations affect their bottom line. One of the deepest regrets Koreans have about history is that their nation’s fate has often been determined by outside forces. It would be tragic for this to be perpetuated by mass indifference to national security and foreign policy. I do not think this will happen. Eventually, circumstances will change in North Korea – hopefully via peaceful transition rather than crisis – and I expect that South Korea, with U.S. support, will take the lead on the Korean Peninsula. With that future at stake, the next generation in South Korea will become more engaged. Meanwhile, Americans should not mind if South Koreans root for the North Korean soccer team; it is more important that South Korean foreign policy continues to root for the alliance with the United States.

Strategic trust between Washington and Beijing

2010-11-01T14:45:00.000-07:00

Yesterday, the New York Times published a letter I wrote regarding U.S.-China relations.

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Relations With China

Mark Landler and Sewell Chan identify recent factors of declining strategic trust between the United States and China (“White House Tries to Build United Front to Face China,” Oct. 26). But not all trend lines are negative.

American and Chinese officials demonstrate improved understanding of each other’s domestic politics of job creation and leadership transition. Each side is getting better at providing notice and explanation for decisions on sensitive issues (trade, currency, Tibet and Taiwan) to minimize disruption to bilateral relations.

The Obama administration knows that calling for a responsible China also means offering a seat at the table, and Beijing may at last recognize that suspending military-to-military relations is counterproductive.

Although national interests allow neither country to fully meet the requests of the other, both sides grasp the importance of keeping United States-China relations on the rails. Expect efforts at trust-building to increase with President Hu Jintao’s visit to Washington.

F-16s and Cross-Strait Relations

2009-11-15T12:38:00.000-08:00

Today the Los Angeles Times published a letter I wrote regarding U.S.-China-Taiwan relations.

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Not sold on F-16 diplomacy

In recommending the United States leverage not selling F-16 jets to Taiwan for better U.S.-China-Taiwan relations, Professor Dennis V. Hickey overlooks three key points.

First, the U.S. has formally assured Taipei that Washington will not hold prior consultations with Beijing regarding arms sales to Taiwan.

Second, while it would be a significant and welcome gesture if China pulled back missiles currently aimed at Taiwan, the military reality is that Beijing could easily redeploy those missiles whenever it wanted.

Third, the U.S. has a legal commitment to Taiwan's defense because of a strategic interest in a stable balance across the Taiwan Strait.

For these reasons, the decision to sell F-16s to Taiwan should be based on consultations between Washington and Taipei, considering security and budgetary factors as well as diplomatic ones.

Beijing has the ability to positively influence the decision-making process – by willingly reducing its military posture toward Taiwan. Doing so could facilitate a landmark summit between the presidents of China and Taiwan, without the U.S. cutting deals that might hurt more than help.

Quoted in the Economist

2009-09-17T22:34:00.000-07:00

Today the Economist quoted a journal article I co-authored with colleagues Tetsuo Kotani and Aki Mori on the foreign policy of the Democratic Party of Japan.

The DPJ and U.S.-Japan relations

2009-09-01T17:17:00.000-07:00

Today Reuters quoted from an interview I did regarding the Japanese elections and U.S.-Japan relations.

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Easley: After the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) comes to power, the biggest change for U.S.-Japan relations will be the number of new faces on the Japanese side. Most of the governing and diplomatic experience in Japan is held by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). It will be important to build trust between officials and show that the U.S.-Japan alliance is not a U.S.-LDP alliance but rather a partnership built on shared national interests and values.

The DPJ government will likely shift some of Japan's diplomatic attention to its neighbors. Washington can encourage this on top of close coordination with Tokyo. If Japan is more trusted and active in Asia, that will be an asset to the U.S.-Japan alliance.

The U.S. should remain sensitive to political developments in Japan while keeping all channels open for cooperation. The DPJ has already toned down some of its campaign rhetoric. Given that it must now face the resource and logistical challenges of governing while representing Japan's national interests, the DPJ will want to keep the solid alliance with the U.S. Some DPJ members may want to revise the terms of the U.S.-Japan relationship, but domestic reforms and economic issues will be the priority as the DPJ tries to show progress to the Japanese public before next year's upper house election.

Balancing internal factions and setting policy priorities will be the immediate challenges for the DPJ as it transitions from an opposition party structure to a governing organization. The DPJ's fortunes will depend on how well it accomplishes administrative reform and leads Japan out of recession. The U.S. should be rooting for the DPJ to tackle Japan's economic structural and demographic issues as this will make Japan a more capable partner over the long-term.

Japan's Elections and Relations with the Two Koreas

2009-08-30T21:40:00.000-07:00

Today the USC Korean Studies Institute published an interview I did regarding Japan's elections and relations with the two Koreas.

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Q: The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won enough seats in Japan's legislative election today to form the next government without the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) that has governed Japan for all but 11 months of the last 54 years. What are the general implications of this change in power?

Easley: The election results are testament to the Japanese public's frustration. The LDP was instrumental in realizing Japan's economic miracle and postwar security, but since the burst of Japan's economic bubble and the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, the LDP has struggled to adjust. The Japanese public has been dissatisfied with the pace of progress on various domestic issues, including economic growth and inequality, bureaucratic mismanagement, and coping with Japan's aging society. If the DPJ is able to effectively deal with Japan's domestic challenges, this can strengthen Japan economically and as a security partner, and that would be good news for Washington and Seoul. The trouble is that nearly all the governing experience in Japan and most of the personal relations with diplomats and officials of other countries is held by the LDP. This will put the new DPJ government under enormous pressure to make a good first impression with its Japanese voters, as well as with Japan's international partners.

Q: Japan's relations with South Korea and China have often been plagued by issues of history and memories of war. How will the DPJ handle these historical sensitivities?

Easley: The DPJ has long advocated that Japan seriously reflect on its history and show greater sensitivity to its neighbors' memories of the past. Toward this end, the DPJ may take a more conciliatory position on the content of history textbooks. Regarding Yasukuni Shrine, DPJ President Yukio Hatoyama has pledged not to visit the shrine and that as prime minister he will see that no members of his cabinet go either. The DPJ may pursue the construction of a secular war memorial for Japanese officials to visit instead of Yasukuni. Such gestures would almost certainly be appreciated by the Korean people and other Asian populations.

On the other hand, the DPJ does not sound flexible on Japan's maritime and territorial disputes with its neighbors, promising to remain firm on Japan's claims. Hatoyama has said that these issues [such as the Dokdo/Takeshima island dispute between Tokyo and Seoul] are difficult to resolve bilaterally because if one side is seen as giving concessions, a nationalist backlash would follow. So Hatoyama suggests that these disputes be resolved in the process of developing an "East Asian Community," along a path of regional integration similar to that traversed by the European Union. This sounds good in principle, but will prove very difficult in practice. Nonetheless, it is important to have big cooperative visions to help nations gradually overcome historical issues. In the short-term, a more realistic but still worthy goal for politicians and diplomats will be not allowing historical issues to derail relations or delay urgently needed cooperation on financial stability, human security and the environment.

Q: What about the implications of the election for Japan's policy toward North Korea?

Easley: Hatoyama has mentioned the possibility of restarting talks with North Korea. Much will depend on how the DPJ handles the issue of Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea decades ago. [Several abductees were returned to Japan; some are reported dead, others are still considered missing. The issue has complicated not only Japan's diplomacy with North Korea, but also Tokyo's ability to coordinate policy in the Six-party Talks]. The DPJ may want to focus on North Korea's nuclear program, missiles and potential political-economic instability, but can not appear soft on the abductions issue because of Japanese public opinion and the possibility that the LDP opposition might use the issue against the DPJ. The interaction between Tokyo and Seoul will also be key. The new DPJ government will need to closely coordinate with Seoul on North Korea, but it is also important for Seoul to reassure Tokyo. Japan in particular has legitimate concerns about North Korea's nuclear and missile programs. If South Korean President Lee Myung-bak's administration shows understanding of Tokyo's security concerns, this would facilitate U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral coordination, which in turn could encourage China to be increasingly helpful in pressing for North Korea's cooperation.

Q: What does the advent of a DPJ government mean for the Obama administration's Korea policy?

Easley: President Obama's team and relevant officials at the State Department are well aware of the complicated strategic geometry in dealing with North Korea. They know pushing too hard could spark a military conflict with North Korea or serious break with China [since Beijing wishes to avoid the collateral effects of a collapse of the North Korean regime]. On the other hand, the Obama administration recognizes that taking a soft line at this point would present credibility problems for U.S. alliances and the international nonproliferation regime and undo progress made to date in having the world hold North Korea accountable for its provocative actions. United Nations sanctions are a counter-proliferation device and punish North Korea's breech of its international commitments. In principle, the sanctions should not be eased just because North Korea is willing to talk. It is important to reengage North Korea diplomatically given the opportunity, but President Obama and President Lee said the pattern where North Korea raises tensions and then returns to talks seeking rewards must be broken. The new government in Tokyo will likely agree. The question now is whether Washington, Tokyo and Seoul, working together with Beijing, will stay on the same page to hold North Korea to account – demanding concrete actions from Pyongyang on disarmament in exchange for concrete improvements in economic and diplomatic relations.

Legacy of Kim Dae-jung

2009-08-18T23:29:00.000-07:00

Today the USC Korean Studies Institute published an interview I did regarding the legacy of former South Korean president Kim Dae-jung.

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Q: Former South Korean President Kim Dae-jung died today at a hospital in Seoul, reportedly of heart failure and complications from pneumonia. He was 85 and remained engaged in politics until his death. How will he be remembered?

Leif-Eric Easley: Kim Dae-jung's administration helped stabilize the South Korean economy after the Asian Financial Crisis in the late 1990s. But he will be remembered most for contributions to South Korean democratization and for the "Sunshine Policy" which sought political reconciliation and economic integration with North Korea. It was for these efforts that Kim won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2000. His legacy was subsequently tarnished however, by revelations of political corruption involving his family and evidence that the landmark inter-Korean summit may have been "bought" via secret payments to Pyongyang. Kim's strategy of engaging North Korea, which was continued by his successor Roh Moo-hyun, was dealt a serious blow when North Korea tested a nuclear device in 2006 and over the years reneged on most agreements it made with Seoul. Nonetheless, former president Kim's efforts for democracy and North-South reconciliation have lasting effects and are a significant legacy.

Q: What does former president's Kim life say about South Korean politics?

Easley: A tremendous amount – the arc of Kim Dae-jung's life is closely tied to that of South Korean politics for the last five decades. It would be a gross over-simplification to only remember Kim Dae-jung as South Korea's president from 1998 to 2003. In the 1960s, Kim Dae-jung emerged on the national stage as President Park Chung-hee's archrival. The divide between these two men reflected and helped define the left-right divide in South Korean politics that persists to this day. Park was of the military and the South Korean elite; Kim was a product of and voice for the masses. Kim Dae-jung was a leading critic of Park Chung-hee's legitimacy (Park came to power in a military coup). Park jailed Kim as a political dissident and may have had him killed if not for U.S. intervention. Kim came from South Korea's southwest region, which has a strong rivalry with the southeast region, home to Park and other presidents. To their respective followers, Park embodied South Korea's rapid economic development while Kim embodied South Korea's democratization. Park was deeply suspicious of North Korea and wanted a strong South Korean military and economy to employ against it; Kim wanted to politically embrace North Korea and integrate the two economies as a step toward ultimately reunifying the Korean Peninsula.

Q: Mr. Kim's funeral will actually be the second this year for a South Korean leader?

Easley: Yes, and the death of a former president is a significant event in South Korea. The passing of former presidents Roh Moo-hyun and Kim Dae-jung this year will likely mark 2009 as the end of a political era for many South Koreans. But while former President Kim Dae-jung will long be a controversial figure in South Korean history, his death of natural causes at age 85 is much less controversial than former President Roh Moo-hyun's suicide three months ago. Former President Roh was the immediate predecessor of the current president, Lee Myung-bak, and was under investigation for corruption charges. Roh's untimely death prompted a public outpouring of sympathy for him and criticism for the current government and its policies. Former President Kim Dae-jung's passing will certainly prompt a period of national mourning, but does not come as such a shock to the Korean public as did former president Roh's suicide.

Q: What implications might D.J. Kim's passing have for North-South Korean relations?

Easley: Perhaps as former President Clinton's visit to Pyongyang provided 'face' for North Korea to adjust its tone toward the United States, public reflection of Kim Dae-jung's life may help provide the political packaging for a new South Korean attempt to talk with the North. While it is not realistic to expect a generous memorial for Kim to forge a grand compromise between South Korean conservatives and progressives on policy toward North Korea, Kim's passing may provide symbolic impetus for some form of reengagement with Pyongyang. Since coming to office last year, the current South Korean president has been rebuffed by Pyongyang as hawkish and disingenuous. But President Lee Myung-bak is making a renewed effort to engage North Korea based on reciprocity, offering humanitarian aid and economic assistance if both sides reduce conventional military deployments along their shared border and if North Korea recommits to dismantling its nuclear weapons program.

Q: Is there any sign that North Korea will respond in a constructive manner?

Easley: North Korea has sent condolences to the South and may ask to send a delegation to former president Kim Dae-jung's funeral. Pyongyang recently received a visit by Hyun Jeong-eun, the chairwoman of Hyundai Group, and released a Hyundai employee held for months on charges that he made inappropriate political statements while in North Korea. There is talk of restarting South Korean tourism to the Mt. Kumgang resort in North Korea and resuming inter-Korean family reunions. However, United Nations mandated sanctions on North Korea's nuclear and missile programs remain in place and are still only in the process of being implemented. Ultimately, you should expect Pyongyang to act according to its interpretation of its own interests. The regime of Kim Jong-il appears focused on securing a stable internal political succession and externally promoting North Korea as a nuclear weapons state. The coming months will be an important period for international efforts aimed at persuading North Korea that its open economic development and complete nuclear disarmament are in everyone's interests.

Survey of Young Asia Specialists on the Spread of Democracy

2009-03-03T00:17:00.000-08:00

I was recently discussing international trends of democracy and good governance with my colleagues Qinghong Wang and Jun Pyon. Our discussion included a survey of prominent policy experts conducted by the Atlantic Monthly. We decided it would be interesting to ask the same questions of younger policy analysts to see whether any generational divide is apparent over democracy's international prospects.

Our online questionnaire can be found here and the original Atlantic Monthly article is here.

Our survey was conducted among young foreign policy experts (members of the Pacific Forum CSIS Young Leaders Program). The sample size was 40, the same number of participants as the original poll. For purposes of comparison, we used the same questions and format as the Atlantic Monthly (AM). The sample was not randomized and is thus not meant to be representative of any population as a whole. The results are, however, meant to reflect the opinions of up-and-coming foreign policy analysts who deal with Asia-Pacific international relations in particular.

The AM group of foreign policy experts had an average age of about 65, while the average age among our sample of Young Leaders was about 30.

Interestingly, Young Leaders are significantly more optimistic about democratic progress since 2000 and moving forward. However, Young Leaders are less confident about the ability of the United States to promote democracy.

The results of the surveys are summarized below. Note that because of rounding, percentages do not always add to 100.

Worldwide, is liberal democracy stronger or weaker than it was in 2000?

Senior policy experts:

28% STRONGER
73% WEAKER

Young Leaders:

53% STRONGER
48% WEAKER

Is the U.S. capable of meaningfully affecting the prospects for democracy in most nondemocratic states?

Senior policy experts:

68% YES
33% NO

Young Leaders:

55% YES
45% NO

Do you believe the proliferation of democratic government is inevitable in the long run?

Senior policy experts:

38% YES
63% NO

Young Leaders:

55% YES
45% NO

We cannot entirely attribute the different outlooks on democracy to generational change because there were other important differences between the surveys:

Our poll was nearly gender balanced (55% men, 45% women), whereas 95% of the AM respondents were men.

Nearly all the AM respondents were American. In our survey, USA respondents were a plurality (16), but respondents were also from: Canada (1), China (6), France (1), India (1), Japan (2), Malaysia (1), Philippines (4), Singapore (1), South Korea (5), Taiwan (2).

Our poll was conducted anonymously. The AM poll did not connect names to responses, but a list of respondents was published in the article.

Our poll was conducted January-February 2009 with results published in March 2009. The Atlantic Monthly published its poll one year earlier, in March 2008.

Having a more gender balanced and internationally diverse sample of policy experts could certainly matter to opinions of democracy, but it is not clear how. (The AM survey report only shared percentage of yes/no responses; with more data, it would be possible to conduct regression analysis).

As for the time lapse between the surveys, there were a number of challenges to democracy that developed across the globe in 2008 (see the Economist Intelligence Unit's Index of Democracy 2008). Thus, one might expect the later poll to be more pessimistic about democracy's progress and prospects, but in fact, the later numbers are more favorable.

Public recognition of counterterrorism successes and political advances in Iraq increased over 2008. Barack Obama was elected president in November 2008 and came to office in January 2009. One might hypothesize that these developments between the times the two polls were conducted would boost American soft power and the perception that the U.S. can positively influence nondemocratic states. However, the later poll shows greater skepticism of America's ability to promote democracy.

Therefore, this exercise suggests there are important differences in the way that established and upcoming generations of policymakers view democracy in the world and America's role in promoting freedom. Given the relative ease with which survey data was collected and summarized via Google Docs, this online technology could be usefully applied in a future effort to gather responses from current policymakers and Young Leaders simultaneously. This would allow a more detailed and reliable comparison of generational views.

I would like to thank all the Young Leaders who participated in this 'plausibility probe' survey; thanks also to Ana Villavicencio for her help disseminating the questionnaire. For more on Young Leaders' views of democracy, see the recent publication:

Brad Glosserman, ed., "Asian Elections 2007-2008: Regional Security Implications," Issues & Insights, Vol. 8, No. 22, November 2008.

For comments on this exercise and suggestions for future research and analysis, please e-mail me.

Who will lead in Asia?

2008-06-23T02:00:00.000-07:00

Today the Los Angeles Times published a letter I wrote concerning the U.S. strategic role in Asia and relations with China.

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In "Who'll lead in Asia?" (Opinion, June 18), Kim Holmes and Walter Lohman convincingly argue that Asia demands greater strategic attention from Washington.

However, they overstate the inevitability of incompatible American and Chinese roles. U.S. policy needs to work with China to lift Asia up rather than work with Asia to hold China down.

There is no doubt that the United States and its partners in Asia should insist that China meet higher standards on military restraint, free trade and the environment.

But it is strategically imperative that the U.S. both help to change and accept China. To do so, Washington must lead as a rising moral power, not a declining superpower.

Closer coordination between Washington, Seoul needed

2007-10-16T20:14:00.000-07:00

Today the Wall Street Journal published a letter I wrote concerning the U.S.-South Korea alliance and relations with North Korea.

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The Oct. 6 editorial-page commentary "Toward an America-Free Korea" by Nicholas Eberstadt, Aaron L. Friedberg and Christopher Griffin actually provides compelling reasons why South Koreans want their alliance with the U.S. to remain strong through the long process of peace-building and integration with North Korea. The authors' premise, that the alliance would end with Korean unification, is false to most South Koreans.

Whether the U.S.-South Korea alliance will persist is not really the question. Better to focus on the alliance's successful transformation and America's future relations with North Korea. Both require closer policy coordination between Washington and Seoul on North Korean denuclearization, conventional arms control and economic development.

Such coordination may be forthcoming after South Korea's December presidential election. While outgoing President Roh Moo-hyun fixated on a symbolic summit with North Korea, the opposition party's presidential candidate Lee Myung-bak (who maintains a 40% lead in the polls) was working to schedule a meeting with President Bush.

Squaring Normalization and Reconciliation

2007-01-31T15:48:00.000-08:00

Today the Japan Times published a letter I wrote concerning nationalism and security.

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In his Jan. 18th article, Gregory Clark argues there are more important issues in Japan-China relations than Yasukuni Shrine. This is true, but the article does not address the more important issues of trade, regional integration, and building trust for security cooperation.

Instead, Mr. Clark pokes fun at Prime Minister Abe's emphasis on shared democratic values with India and Australia. The article assumes that since China has temporarily put away the Yasukuni card, Beijing will not confront Tokyo on other issues -- a poor assumption, especially when it comes to Taiwan. Finally, Mr. Clark says that Japanese leaders use North Korea "to justify a significant upgrading in Japan's military spending" when Japan's defense budget is actually shrinking by a third of a percent.

It seems Mr. Clark is less concerned with Japan-China relations than he is with Japanese nationalism. Rather than hastily labeling Japan's diplomatic and military normalization as dangerous, we should be asking how a greater international role for Tokyo can go hand in hand with better relations in Northeast Asia. The keys are historical reconciliation and greater military and political transparency. These need to be priorities not only for Tokyo, but also for Beijing.

History and security in East Asia

2006-08-22T02:34:00.000-07:00

Today the Washington Post published a letter I wrote about historical reconciliation and East Asian security.

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Japan's Difficult Reconciliation
Tuesday, August 22, 2006; Page A14

G. John Ikenberry's Aug. 17 op-ed, "Japan's History Problem," provides excellent analysis but misses three key points.

First, Japanese normalization and historical reconciliation are not entirely at cross-purposes. Revising Article 9 of Japan's constitution to make the Japanese military legal, while Tokyo continues to disavow offensive capabilities, would bring Japanese law in line with reality. Constitutional reform is important for making Japan's defense policy and contributions to international security trustworthy and legitimate.

Second, the history problem in Asia is not just Japan's problem. China and Korea have biased nationalist histories to address as well. Moreover, while apologies and conciliatory behavior from Tokyo may remove the most immediate obstacles to cooperation with China and Korea, this is a long way from these countries accepting Japanese leadership. South Korea and the United States may share national interests with a more engaged Japan, but it is doubtful that China will see an elevated Japanese role as in its interest, no matter what Tokyo does to bury the past.

Finally, East Asia is not Europe. Europe is filled with democracies and has no North Korea. Even so, Russia is far from becoming a member of NATO or the European Union. Achieving an East Asian security organization inclusive of China would be a great asset to regional peace. But different regional contexts may call for different paths to integration.

For the United States, regional security in East Asia is best pursued by expanding the sphere of cooperation centered on strong alliances, built during the Cold War and transformed to meet contemporary international challenges.

LEIF-ERIC EASLEY
Cambridge, Mass.

Remembering September 11

2006-08-18T12:05:00.000-07:00

Today the Asia Times published a letter I wrote about the purpose and meaning of the new film World Trade Center.

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Contrary to Ruth Rosen's analysis (Great movie, pity about the Big Lie, Aug 18), I found World Trade Center to be carefully and respectfully detached from politics. While misperceptions about the war on terror are important to address in public debate, I don't see why it should be Oliver Stone's job to tell America how related or unrelated Iraq is to September 11 [2001]. The movie is not a documentary on global politics. It consciously stays above the fray of war spin from Republicans and Democrats. The movie's short portrayals of [US President George W] Bush and [former New York mayor Rudolph] Giuliani could have glorified them or criticized them, but does neither. This movie is politically neutral. While keeping more or less true to the facts of that horrible day, it focuses on terribly trying personal experiences, purposely steering clear of controversial historical and political context. Why? Because the film aims to capture the events of just one single day, a day that will remain seared into the psyche of Americans for a long long time. The message of the movie is not a political one but a human one: people are capable of horrible things, but they are also capable of compassion, sacrifice and unity of purpose. On September 11, that compassion, sacrifice and unity were not for any political end but for the sake of what is right, and ultimately, what's worth living for: the good of humanity.

Engaging North Korea

2006-07-25T19:15:00.000-07:00

The article below was published in the PacNet Newsletter, Vol. 8, No. 32A, July 24, 2006, and reprinted in the Jakarta Post and GLOCOM Japan; an earlier version appears in the Korea Times.

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Building trust or giving it away? The Roh Administration’s engagement of the North
by Leif-Eric Easley

South Korean President Roh Moo-Hyun’s engagement policy of the North is facing serious challenges. North Korea’s provocative missile tests on July 5 met with unanimous condemnation by the United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1695 requires sanctions on missile-related transfers to North Korea and demands Pyongyang suspend its ballistic missile activities. One month earlier in South Korean elections, President Roh’s Uri Party was trounced by the opposition Grand National Party which favors a tougher line on North Korea. These developments place Roh’s engagement policy under both international and domestic pressure, renewing debate over how Seoul manages its relations with Pyongyang.

Since coming to office in 2003, President Roh’s approach has been widely considered either a policy of appeasement or a bold effort to build inter-Korean trust. The logic of appeasement says rather than confront Pyongyang militarily (very costly) or diplomatically hold it accountable for its behavior (potentially costly in the event of a North Korean collapse), better to bribe North Korea and avoid it becoming even more of a problem. This strategy would be rational, weighing expected costs and benefits, except that appeasement has historically proven to simply delay conflict. Most of President Roh’s critics object to his North Korea policy as charting this path toward failure.

Proponents of the Roh approach argue that trust building is essential for North-South reconciliation and eventual reunification. A “see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil” policy works much better than an “axis of evil” policy because it helps establish effective working relations based on trust. At some stage mutual trust will require a shared concept of Korean identity and comparable visions of what a unified Korean Peninsula will look like. But for now, building trust between North and South means getting to a point where the two can depend on each other to make good on their commitments, regardless of what third countries (especially the United States and China) say or do. This is the kind of trust the Roh administration has tried to establish, and costly signaling via unconditional engagement is arguably a good way of doing it.

The question then, is whether the policy is working. Have years of “sunshine” actually built trust with the North, and if so, at what cost? North-South contacts and exchanges have markedly increased, and while often delayed by Pyongyang, historical patterns of postponement and fiery rhetoric have tempered. South Korean aid to the North has grown unabated but is often not confirmed to reach intended recipients. The Kaesong Industrial Zone brought inter-Korean trade to unprecedented levels, despite the North demanding concessions while backtracking on commitments. South Korean tourism to the North and separated family meetings expanded, although Pyongyang showed little cooperation regarding South Korean POWs and abductees. There were high hopes for a visit to the North by former President Kim Dae-Jung on rail links severed since the Korean War, but these remained blocked by the North Korean army. Military confidence building between North and South made little progress and the Six-Party Talks addressing North Korea’s nuclear programs have been stalled for nearly a year.

While it is not clear whether the Roh administration’s policy has built significant trust with North Korea, it has clearly damaged trust within the South Korea-U.S. alliance. Systematic efforts by the Roh administration to downplay the North Korean threat reduce U.S. confidence in the ROK and undermine public perceptions of the alliance in South Korea. Statements made by Roh administration officials suggesting the U.S. is as much the problem as North Korea in the nuclear standoff raise eyebrows in Washington. All this interacts poorly with U.S. global force restructuring and strategic flexibility doctrine, which in turn erodes South Korean trust in the alliance.

The Roh administration’s pursuit of a policy with uncertain benefits and obvious costs implies a wager: that in the long-term, trust with North Korea is more important than trust with the U.S., and improving one naturally comes at the expense of the other. Such a wager is understandable if one’s passion is for an independent unified Korea. But what if South Korea’s relations with North Korea and the U.S. need not be managed in zero-sum terms? Does building North-South trust really require Seoul to distance itself from Washington? A South Korean policy that holds Pyongyang more accountable for its actions and restores South Korea-U.S. confidence might actually raise the effectiveness of engagement because North Korean reciprocity is ultimately necessary for mutual trust on the Korean Peninsula.

After years of nearly unconditional engagement, Seoul has gained leverage in dealing with the North. The Roh administration is now considering putting this leverage to use. During inter-Korean economic cooperation talks one week after the South Korean elections, Seoul departed from previous negotiations by stipulating a precondition: South Korea would provide additional aid to the North only after the cross-border railway tests cancelled by Pyongyang are rescheduled. In North-South ministerial talks after the missile tests, South Korea warned against any further provocations and declined all North Korean requests for economic assistance. The North responded by walking out of the meetings. This developing situation calls for a recalibration of Seoul’s engagement policy.

While South Korea can usefully exercise leverage over the North, care is needed to avoid squandering this leverage and increasing mistrust. The delicate balance will be to keep channels of communication open with Pyongyang while demanding greater reciprocity. One way to do this is by continuing rice and fertilizer aid and economic cooperation at the Kaesong Industrial Zone while making some assistance, such as grants and loans for North Korean light industries, contingent on Pyongyang’s actions. Seoul can also make clear what further economic cooperation is possible once North Korea returns to the Six-Party Talks.

To help maintain trust with other nations, Seoul can restart the South Korea-Japan-U.S. policy consultation meetings known as the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG). Disputes over history in ROK-Japan relations have caused this important consultation mechanism to lie dormant for three years. Meanwhile, Washington and Tokyo have gone on coordinating policy without Seoul in the room. Better for South Korea to take every opportunity to have its interests represented in policies concerning North Korea.

Enhanced coordination among South Korea, Japan and the U.S. can bring North Korea back to the table. But if Pyongyang refuses to rejoin the Six-Party Talks, five-way talks could be held for the purpose of drawing up “red lines” for North Korean behavior – such as performing a nuclear test or firing missiles over another country – and how these would be met with concerted action by the five parties.

Unconditional engagement of North Korea has yielded uncertain benefits and clear costs, and appears out of step with international diplomacy as well as South Korean public opinion. Now is time for the Roh administration to recalibrate its engagement policy to build trust without giving it away.

South Korea-U.S. alliance

2006-06-05T01:46:00.000-07:00

I recently attended a track II dialogue on the state of the U.S.-ROK alliance. I found the following to be the key points of the meeting.

- The international security environment saw a process of redefinition after the Cold War, later punctuated by September 11th. Redefining international security means broadening the U.S.-ROK alliance. But it also means the need for compromise on how the U.S. wants to resolve matters like North Korea.

- Interesting things happen when international relations theory meets reality. Perhaps this is at root of some South Korea-U.S. disagreements. President Bush pushes the democratic peace theory, President Roh pushes neo-liberal, functionalist integration theory. The two administrations are working off different assumptions and neither president’s policies actually fit their theory.

- The current international tension among states comes from the U.S. moving on to a 21st century vision of international politics (focused on human security) while others still prefer the Westphalian system (based on state sovereignty). The pressing question for Asia then, is whether the Chinese value system, development model and nonintervention principle will compete with the U.S. vision?

- Lee Jung-suk taking over as Unification Minister does not represent policy change. He is however, more focused on new developments in ROK-China relations. Progressives say China is colonizing North Korea through increasing investment, trying to make North Korea the fourth province of northeast China; their conclusion: U.S. needs to get softer on North Korea. Conservatives agree China is colonizing North Korea but come to a very different conclusion: Seoul can’t trust Beijing and must work closer with Washington.

- It is a mistake to attribute strains in the alliance simply to the Bush-Roh dynamic. International structural conditions and especially the landscape of Korean domestic politics have changed since there was last a conservative party in control of the Blue House. It is thus a false hope to think that the alliance will return to the "good ol' days" if a GNP president is elected.

- The Bush administration sees the Six Party Talks as a waste of time until North Korea decides to give up its nukes. So the U.S. has switched from a sequential to parallel approach, also focusing on areas where the DPRK has hostile policies toward the U.S. (counterfeiting, trafficking of illicit cargo) and taking action through alternative mechanisms. But the Six Party Talks are unlikely to fall apart: all sides want to keep a ceiling on conflict, China does not want to loose face, the U.S. does not want to lose leverage of multiple actors and North Korea doesn’t want to lose a way out.

- Several interesting points were offered on the topic of anti-Americanism in South Korea:
* Many newspapers (where the older generation gets their news) are conservative, many television and internet media (where the younger generation gets their news) are very liberal.
* Anti-Americans are a vocal minority; 386 generation is exceptional (protest culture, not very internationalized) but important because they are distorting history in Korean education system (via policymaking, teachers unions).
* Media gives distorted perspective by over-covering radical anti-American activists, NGOs.
* Divide between U.S. and ROK is more between their leaderships than between their societies.
* Anti-Americanism is a threat to the alliance to the extent that U.S. policymakers take newspaper reports too seriously, see Korea as ungrateful and advocate its abandonment.
* But while anti-Americanism may not be pervasive, if it flares up during a campaign, it can change the outcome of the election.
* Need to recognize and further study different kinds of anti-Americanism: anti-U.S. foreign policy very different from anti-Americanization (associated with globalization).

Finally, here are what I consider the most important unanswered questions from the meeting:

1. How would Koreans like the U.S.-ROK alliance to look different from the U.S.-Japan alliance?

2. How do changing Korean perceptions of China compare to changing American perceptions of China?

3. How to productively address the status of Kaesong in the KORUS FTA negotiations?

U.S.-Japan-China relations

2006-04-10T15:54:00.000-07:00

I recently attended a meeting of security specialists from China, Japan and the U.S. Below are what I considered the highlights of the conference.

1. The Yasukuni issue was discussed at length as a stumbling block in Sino-Japanese relations. For resolving the issue, many looked to the post-Koizumi era. Others suggested some intervention by the United States. But there was no consensus on what the U.S. could do. Tokyo and Beijing each wants Washington to weigh in on its side, and for obvious reasons, it would be difficult for the U.S. to play the role of unbiased intermediary. It seemed to most participants that the U.S. has more to lose than gain by getting involved and that the issue would be best addressed by Japan and China themselves. But Japanese leaders are not willing to back down because of China, presently seeing no face-saving exit on the history issue or end to Chinese criticisms. And Chinese leaders appear unwilling to give up the moral stick as long as criticizing Japan plays well at home and while any headline suggesting Chinese capitulation may incite a nationalist backlash. It appears the issue will remain intractable until both sides can tacitly agree to ratchet down the rhetoric and move forward on more substantive issues in the bilateral relationship.

2. Different strategic visions of the region were discussed. It remained unclear how much overlap or tension exists among the three major visions outlined: U.S. hegemonic stability, China’s new security concept, and ASEAN driven regional integration. The expansion of the Six Party Talks mechanism was seen as a possibility, but prospects for moving beyond the current nuclear impasse appear low at present. There was an apparent consensus among participants that the vision of the region must include increased national openness, deeper meaningful interdependence, and concerted efforts for stability. Economic nationalism (protectionism) and backlashes to globalization were identified as real dangers. It was pointed out that Franco-German reconciliation was embedded in European regionalization, suggesting that better Sino-Japanese relations may require a deeper institutional context, especially given the current historical experiment of simultaneously strong Chinese and Japanese nations.

3. This fed into discussions of East Asia community building. In my view, the major debate here was over the role of values. How important are shared values to community building? Some participants thought community building should proceed based on shared interests (especially economic interests as in APEC and ASEAN) and allow for diverse and even contradictory value systems (“harmony in diversity”). Others argued that community building without shared values would ultimately be shallow and lead to conflict. Some participants questioned how serious the United States is about democracy promotion, while others suggested this would be over-reaching for the U.S., and to the extent Japan is involved, may encourage diplomatic isolation of Tokyo in the region. Perhaps rather than revisit the “Asian values” debate of the 1990s, it would be more productive to look ahead to how and why particular actors’ international (and domestic political) norms may eventually prevail in the regionalization process.

4. This raises the question of regional leadership. Interestingly, there appears to be a competition among the three countries to avoid the designation of regional leader. American participants avoided describing the role of the U.S. as hegemon and instead focused on U.S. efforts to work with allies to stabilize the region and for engaging (in stark contrast to containing) China. Chinese participants argued that Beijing is necessarily focused on economic development and is happy to work with Washington on security issues and leave the driving of regional integration to ASEAN. Japanese participants suggested that Japan seeks not regional leadership but the respect and status it deserves, and the acceptance and support of the means by which it can make further contributions to regional and global prosperity. In sum, all sides were politically savvy and strategic in presenting their country’s views on regional leadership. Perhaps it would be useful to address the matter from a different angle at a future conference, for example, by considering the international political initiatives on offer by each government and how these ideas are resonating and finding support in other capitals.

5. At this conference, many Japanese and American participants seemed impressed with the ideas and recommendations advanced by several Chinese participants. These included:
- supporting greater Taiwan participation in regional/global affairs
- Chinese freeing themselves from a victim’s mentality
- Chinese education and press presenting a more balanced historical view of Japan
- PRC leadership telling their people how Japan normalized relations with China before Washington had formal diplomatic relations with Beijing, how Japan played an important role in China’s economic development (through investment, business models, technology transfer), and how Japan was the first country to raise sanctions after Tiananmen.
- build a national memorial museum focused on the Cultural Revolution
- cultivate people-people exchanges and warm feelings toward Japan
These statements were of course made by individuals in their own capacity (not representing organizations, the party or the government) but many attendees at the conference were impressed that these points were outlined and articulated so clearly. This appeared to reflect 1) a diverse and congenial gathering of experts far from their respective capitals, 2) how some certain issues were rarely if ever raised at the conference, i.e. Taiwan or the "China threat" and 3) greater confidence, balance and sophistication in the Chinese position.

6. Finally, key points were made at the conference about the need to build crisis management capacity between Japan and China. Specifically, concerns were expressed about the possibility of a Sino-Japanese naval dispute over islands, resources or territorial waters. To prevent a miscalculation at sea escalating to an international crisis, calls were made for better Sino-Japanese mil-mil and government-government communication. In particular, it was suggested that mechanisms be implemented in terms of maritime codes of conduct, rules of engagement and crisis management as soon as possible.

Japan-U.S. alliance

2006-03-06T14:31:00.000-08:00

I recently attended a meeting of U.S.-Japan alliance managers in San Francisco. Below are several interesting issues raised in discussion, with links to related resources.

One provocative suggestion made at the conference was for a Japan-U.S. FTA. At issue of course would be Japanese market liberalization, especially concerning agricultural protection.
http://www.cfr.org/publication/8058/on_japan.html?breadcrumb=default

Basing issues were discussed within the context of the recent 2+2 agreement and local opposition to force realignment plans. Japanese domestic support for U.S. military bases was called the "weakest link" in the Japan-U.S. alliance, requiring greater attention from both sides.
http://www.eastwestcenter.org/res-pr-detail.asp?resproj_ID=159

With the recent trend of upgrading the alliance, the old question of "will Japan become the UK of Asia?" resurfaced. Opinions differed, but it was clear that dialogue about the alliance was much more "values based" than years past. Shared values were cited as a basis for broadening and deepening the alliance's roles and missions. It was also pointed out that speaking of "values" may be a politically correct, less threatening way to address mutual Japan-U.S. concerns over China.
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/v05n03_pdf[1].pdf

Related to my remarks on Japanese hard vs. soft power, many participants argued that Japan has "international political capital" to spend, particularly by weighing in on global security issues. http://www.globescan.com/news_archives/bbcpoll06-3.html

In a noted departure from the so-called "reactionary" security policies of the past (where Japan was primarily seen to be responding to American gaiatsu), at this meeting many Japanese delegates expressed an active desire on the part of Japan to be more involved, for example, in nuclear negotiations with Iran.
http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=3742555

This elicited American comments implying "be careful what you wish for" and speculation about what greater international security role Japan desires. Some Japanese delegates suggested that the U.S. is not being supportive enough of Japan's UNSC bid (http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/reform/index.html). Others suggested Japan act as a "thought leader" for the region (seemingly in reference to Foreign Minister Aso's recent speech).

In discussions of Japanese international contribution and regional leadership, of course the Yasukuni issue came up, (see related postings). The concern expressed by many Japanese delegates was that the Yasukuni controversy is giving China the "moral high ground" to expand its influence in Southeast Asia.
http://www.japanfocus.org/article.asp?id=414

American participants often cited the importance of paying more attention to India. It is no coincidence that the Bush administration is upgrading diplomatic efforts with India with a focus on economic and nuclear cooperation.
http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_progj/task,view/id,526/

Finally, what I consider the major open questions of the conference: looking forward, what are Japan's comfortable limits on international security missions (humanitarian operations, UN-sanctioned interventions, collective defense, rear area support for coalitions of the willing?) and to what extent is the U.S. comfortable with Japan engaging in more independent foreign/security policies (concerning normalization with the DPRK, Iran nuclear and energy negotiations, China policy, etc.)? In other words, what are reasonable expectations for future U.S.-Japan security cooperation and where might Japanese and American national interests diverge?

The Bush-Koizumi partnership appears rock solid and resolved to push the alliance forward (and sweep bad news under the carpet). So it may be until the next administrations take over in Washington and Tokyo that we are able to answer these questions.

The costs of using history

2005-12-29T01:08:00.000-08:00

How might national leaders be given (or effectively come to perceive) necessary incentives for putting the history issue in the past?

Before I attempt a tentative answer to this question, let me first say what “putting history in the past” might mean. The truth is historical antagonisms will never go away completely; history will constantly be reinterpreted to fit the purposes of those doing the interpreting. So what I mean by “putting history in the past” is getting (back) to a point where the politics of historical memory do not prevent leaders from meeting, do not inspire a spiral of nationalistic statements and actions by leaders, and do not weigh heavily on expectations for future relations (manifested in foreign direct investment, military contingency planning, etc.)

This being said, what changed incentives are necessary for governments to contain (or even reduce) the negative effects of historical antagonisms? If we assume leaders want to preserve their position, the problem is that “using” historical antagonisms presently appears helpful for maintaining power. But is this necessarily the case? Not if leaders’ incentives were to change so that healing international historical wounds actually helped them domestically. How might such change of incentives come about, to the benefit of more cooperative international relations in Northeast Asia?

The answer has to do with economics and accountability. Second only to providing for physical security and maintaining a domestic monopoly on its enforcement, governments stay in power by advancing the economic livelihood of their people. While it’s true that governments can “use” historical issues to aid their own legitimacy, divert people’s attention away from domestic problems by rallying them around the flag, and be deployed as a stick against other government’s policies, such tactics are generally bad for business. If the historical issues in Northeast Asia get much worse, they will visibly weigh on people’s prosperity. Are the publics of Japan, China and South Korea sophisticated enough to understand this? Of course. Are they willing to take their leaders to task for failing to act in their greater economic interests? I think yes.

For leaders’ incentives to change for putting history in the past, they need to be convinced of the economic costs of history politics, and publics need to hold their governments accountable for these costs.

Yasukuni Shrine

2005-10-22T16:35:00.000-07:00

On October 17th, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi made his annual visit to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine. The public and diplomatic reactions from the PRC and ROK were strong as with past visits. I was in Taipei at the time, and observed a different sentiment in Taiwan. Numerous people I spoke with were by no means supportive of Koizumi’s visits, but rather than being outraged, they felt at a loss about why the Prime Minister makes these visits at the expense of Japan’s relations with Asian neighbors. I was asked to provide explanation of the motivations behind the visits, which I summarize in five points below.

1. Perhaps Koizumi’s greatest political asset is his tough, uncompromising image. This is what helped him convincingly win the September election. Before assuming the Prime Ministership, Koizumi-san promised he would visit Yasukuni every year. This pledge has been widely publicized and he wants to be seen as making good on his promise. I believe that Koizumi’s personality and personal pledge are a piece of the puzzle, but a piece we might see resolved once he steps down as Prime Minister.

2. A reasonably cynical view about Koizumi’s Yasukuni visits is that he goes for domestic political gain. But this explanation is loosing traction. At first, Koizumi lacked strong factional support as an LDP ‘maverick’ and may have needed Yasukuni to gain conservative backing. But Koizumi’s political situation is strong today, and Yasukuni is becoming more unpopular in Japanese domestic politics.

3. A more difficult matter is the role of Yasukuni Shrine in Japanese society. I have met Japanese who deeply believe that the souls of their lost ancestors reside at Yasukuni. Koizumi and others may genuinely feel it is their duty to show respect to those who died in the service of their country. This seems to merit understanding and respect from outsiders. The problem is Yasukuni is a polluted national memorial. It is a Shinto shrine with historical links to Japanese militarism. It is administered by people with a deeply revisionist view of Japanese imperialism. Most problematically, Yasukuni priests secretly decided to enshrine the spirits of war criminals there decades after the war. So by going to Yasukuni, it can appear that Koizumi is violating the postwar separation of church and state, endorsing revisionist history, and worshiping war criminals. And yet, since no other major national memorial to Japan’s war dead exists, Koizumi may be going primarily to pay his respects and pray for peace. What needs to be addressed here is the role of Yasukuni in Japanese society. For years I have suggested building a secular memorial to those fallen Japanese (both military and civilian) who sacrificed and suffered for their country. The new memorial need not focus on responsibility, blame or apology, but should be a monument unquestionably devoted to peace, where Japanese officials and the public can go to pay their respects. This matter however, is not for Chinese, Koreans, Southeast Asians or Americans to decide, it is for the Japanese people to resolve.

4. Which brings me to what I think is perhaps the strongest explanation for Koizumi’s continued visits: that he will not change his position vis-à-vis Yasukuni to please China. His personal beliefs, his international calculus, and Japanese public opinion demand that Koizumi avoid concessions to Beijing on Yasukuni. There are many reasons for this dynamic, one being concerns over China’s rise and another being Japanese apology fatigue. The dilemma here is that the more China, Korea and others demand that Koizumi not visit Yasukuni, the more locked in he is to going. This is unfortunate because the damage to bilateral relations is real and the negative perceptions of Japan among people in neighboring countries are persisting and even deepening. This tragic interaction of domestic and international politics could be ameliorated with visible action by Japanese and/or regional leaders to put history in the past.

5. The reason this may not happen could be more serious than a coordination problem, lingering historical antagonisms or face-saving politics. It may be that the Chinese and other national leaderships want to retain anti-Japanese sentiment to use for their own political benefit. More to the point of the discussion here, it may be that Koizumi-san actually wants to antagonize Japan’s neighbors, especially China. Why? Because while the threat from North Korea may be enough to bolster support for missile defense and a more integrated U.S.-Japan security alliance, it is not enough to revolutionize Japan’s defense posture, amend Article 9 of the Constitution or allow Tokyo to take a more assertive international role. These changes, should they be deemed strategically necessary by Japan’s leadership, would likely require heightened public concern for China, especially given the trajectory of Japanese economic interdependence with the PRC. Violent, seemingly unreasonable, anti-Japanese protests in China coupled with stern diplomatic warnings from Beijing feed such public concern. So it may be that Yasukuni is simply a pawn in a strategy of Japanese elites to redefine Japan’s role on the global stage. I personally find this pessimistic view somewhat alarmist. I think good relations with Asian neighbors are helpful, even necessary, for Japan’s international goals and continued prosperity. I think most Japanese would agree. So domestic debate in Japan may increasingly turn to the question: "are prime ministerial visits to Yasukuni in the national interest?"

Japanese elections and foreign policy

2005-09-17T23:47:00.000-07:00

I was recently asked whether Prime Minister Koizumi won the landslide victory for his Liberal Democratic Party on September 11 because of his positions on postal reform or foreign policy. I was also asked whether this electoral victory will lead to a more assertive Japanese approach in its relations with China.

On Q1: I don’t think Japanese voters were particularly sold on Koizumi-san’s postal reform or his foreign policy. I think they voted for his boldness and image. Koizumi masterfully avoided talking about specifics or a broad range of issues before the election; instead, he took unprecedented bold political action to convey to voters his strength and determination. By purging anti-postal reform LDP members and running assassins against them, and calling an early election where Koizumi bet not just his own political career but the future of the entire LDP, Koizumi seized the initiative, the headlines, and most importantly, the voter’s confidence for reelection.

On Q2: my sense is Koizumi is not anti-China, but that he believes Japan should stand up to China when necessary for the national interest (and when it’s politically convenient for the prime minister of course). Koizumi’s victory does make him less reliant on the nationalist vote. But I don’t think Koizumi will give ground (Re: Yasukuni, island disputes or other such issues) without getting something in return. So my tentative answer to the question is I don’t think Koizumi will be increasingly antagonistic of China after the election, but I don’t see him unilaterally extending any olive branches either.

In addition, I would offer several key implications of this election:

1. The outcome bodes well for U.S.-Japan relations. I think we can expect gradually increasing cooperation in the security alliance.

2. The outcome is probably good news for economic reform, although the pace will likely remain slow. While I said the election results probably shouldn’t be interpreted as blanket approval of postal privatization, I think there is strong public sentiment against complacency on economic reform.

3. The Democratic Party of Japan, recently thought to be bringing Japan into a stable 2-party system, is now a basket case. Students of Japanese politics will be intensely watching the reorganization of the DPJ to see how it might mount a comeback or continue to fall.

4. I’m a little concerned about backsliding on the part of the LDP if and when Koizumi steps down once his LDP president clock runs out in September 2006. Of course, it's not impossible that the LDP constitution might be revised to allow him to stay on…but people I've spoken with in the Koizumi administration (off the record) seem pretty confident Koizumi will stay just one more year, will groom a successor in his cabinet, and will bring the JSDF home from Iraq.

5. Which leads me to my final point: the increasing likelihood of a government push to revise the Japanese Constitution. The LDP-Komeito coalition now has the super-majority necessary in the Diet. But although amending the Constitution appears more likely now than it ever has, it is by no means a cakewalk. There are many points on which the Constitution may be revised, and support on these various points is fractionalized and contentious. Most relevant for Japan’s international relations – revision of Article 9 – would be politically sensitive for Komeito (whose votes are necessary for the supermajority), and strongly contested in the Japanese public, to say nothing of objections from Japan’s neighbors. The process for constitutional revision is also difficult, logistically because it’s never been done before, and in terms of public opinion, because a referendum would be necessary. This isn’t to say that Koizumi can’t pull it off. The LDP will likely test the waters by publishing a revision suggestion once the postal reform bill passes. Needless to say, the next year will be a very interesting time for Japanese politics.

Japanese textbooks

2005-09-08T11:22:00.000-07:00

Japan's rekishi mondai (history problem) with Asian neighbors significantly involves the treatment of Japanese imperialism and war in government approved textbooks. Chinese, Koreans and others often object Japanese textbooks at best white-wash Japan's imperial past, and at worst distort and manipulate history for political purposes.

I have often been surprised by the apparent lack of historical knowledge among Japanese students (many Americans' lack of historical knowledge frankly scares me, but that's another discussion…) Suffice it to say, history education is a real problem in Japan. But many of the international charges against Japanese textbooks are made based on hearsay, not on actual readings of Japanese textbooks.

This is where Japan Echo comes in. A website just launched (http://www.je-kaleidoscope.jp/) provides a collection of translations (in English, Chinese and Korean) of Japanese middle school history textbooks approved by the Ministry of Education. Making this material available online is important work for closing perception gaps on the history issue and facilitating good-faith efforts to improve history education in our countries.

The information will not have an impact, however, unless word gets out about the project. I am presently conducting research in Korea and regularly read the Chosunilbo, Hankookilbo/Korea Times, JoongAng Daily, Korea Herald and Hankyoreh. I haven’t seen any coverage in these papers about the Japan Echo translations, so I have written suggesting they mention the website in any upcoming articles about the textbook issue.

I have read Korean news reports that the Fusosha textbook (probably the most revisionist) has been adopted by less than half a percent of Japanese schools. Korean sources have noted this is thanks in part to the efforts of Japanese civil groups advocating a boycott of the text. And more than one editorial has suggested an alliance of Japanese and Korean civil society groups to discourage the use of revisionist textbooks.

It is worth noting that the recently published Korea-China-Japan joint history textbook has received favorable press and sales here in Korea. I have not yet read this volume, but have heard it represents a start in building common understandings of history, despite current limitations of the project (I am told that what the three sides couldn't agree on was basically thrown out, leaving serious gaps in historical coverage).

Finally, I have also noticed that Korea is engaging in some healthy self-criticism on the textbook issue – the Korean Ministry of Education is soliciting suggestions on their website about how to improve Korean history textbooks.