South Korean Views of North Korea and the U.S.

Today the USC Korean Studies Institute published an interview I did regarding South Korean public opinion.

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A recent survey suggests that 70 percent of South Koreans would root for North Korea in a soccer match against the United States. What does this say about South Korean public opinion, even as Seoul and Washington cooperate in dealing with Pyongyang?

I always find the hypothetical soccer match question interesting, especially after experiencing the 2002 World Cup in Korea. But I think the question is a poor proxy for measuring trends relevant to foreign policy. Rooting for the North Korean soccer team is a near costless way for South Koreans to express ethnic nationalism. Korea has long been a painfully divided nation, so emotions are involved when South Koreans watch North Korean soccer, and this real-life drama sells well in the media. What is more, one might root for the North Korean footballers and sympathize with the North Korean people, but detest the regime in Pyongyang. One might also have an affinity for the U.S. but care little about the American soccer team. So I don’t think South Korean support of North Korean footballers says much about political or economic willingness to engage the North, the desire for unification, or the level of support for Pyongyang vs. Washington.

So does the soccer question have any real political significance?

Sport can be a factor as well as a reflection of national identity. Major sports events can capture or even help define the public mood for a time. Sports heroes, controversies and analogies can affect politics, and politics often surrounds sport, as with the Beijing Olympics. The ethnic nationalism often expressed in soccer also shapes South Korean views of the North, as well as South Korean views of how other countries relate to Pyongyang. But we should not read too much into South Korean allegiances in a hypothetical soccer match. How often do the U.S. and North Korean teams actually face each other on the pitch? A less hypothetical situation involves how South Koreans tend to root for whichever team is playing Japan. So perhaps a more interesting question – given recent events – would be the balance of South Korean support in a Japan vs. China match. It would also be interesting to see if South Koreans would be less supportive of the North Korean team if it started to outperform the South in international competition. Pan-Korean nationalism may be a powerful force among soccer fans, but I suspect South Korean nationalism is quite a bit stronger.

Isn’t there a tendency in South Korea to frame the nuclear standoff as a North Korea vs. U.S. issue? And don’t some South Koreans like to see the North stand up to America?

South Koreans know their government is not a spectator but an interested and involved actor in the nuclear standoff. While South Koreans are generally desensitized to North Korean threats and see outright war as improbable, they are still conscious that the situation can become one of life and death or involve potential shocks for the South Korean economy and taxpayer. There is little doubt that nuclear weapons are important to North Korean nationalism and a desire to stand up to the U.S. (and China, for that matter). Some South Koreans say that pursuing nuclear weapons makes sense for Pyongyang, given its external threat perceptions and how its conventional military forces are outmatched by those of South Korea and the U.S. But trying to understand or even justify North Korean behavior is not the same as supporting it. South Koreans are increasingly critical of the North since Pyongyang apparently tested two nuclear devices, cheated on the nonproliferation regime and Six-party Talks agreements, and attacked South Korea. The general sense in South Korea is that Pyongyang’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is a misuse of resources by a Kim family regime that antagonizes outsiders and traps the North Korean people in oppressive poverty.

Does this mean Americans do not have cause to worry about South Korean public opinion?

Sympathies among South Koreans for the North remain significant and important, and some historical suspicion and resentment of the U.S. endures. So it would be imprudent for Americans to interpret the Lee Myung-bak government’s very positive orientation toward the U.S. and relatively tough stance on North Korea as a consensus opinion. Future developments with the North, and especially within South Korea’s domestic politics, might produce a shift in foreign policy. A major lesson of the early 2000s was that the U.S. needs to better understand South Korean pride and ethnic nationalism. That lesson is being reflected in improvements in handling incidents involving U.S. forces in South Korea, care to avoid unilateral policies on North Korea, and calls for progress in relations between Seoul and Pyongyang before the U.S. seriously reengages with the North.

Has the sinking of South Korea’s Cheonan naval vessel and North Korea’s shelling of Yeonpyeong Island fundamentally changed South Korean views of the North?

Certainly those attacks hardened South Korean public opinion in the short-term. But it is yet unclear whether the Cheonan and Yeonpyeongdo incidents will affect South Korean opinions over the long-term as much as the June 15, 2000 North-South summit and the Sunshine Policy. Many Koreans are likely to view recent events as confirmation of what they already believe. Ultra-conservatives assert that North Korea’s regime is a threat and must be defeated; ultra-progressives assert that the Lee Myung-bak administration and the U.S. pushed North Korea into a corner and thus provoked violence. The young generation is more susceptible to recent events as formative experiences, but it is too soon to tell how Cheonanham and Yeonpyeongdo will shape their views.

We often hear that young South Koreans are focused on jobs and see the situation with North Korea as out of their hands. Do they tend to be aloof to Pyongyang’s provocations?

New survey-based research in South Korea suggests that the young generation cares about socio-economic issues more than the ideological divides of previous generations who experienced the Korean War and democratization. South Koreans in their 20s and 30s appear very pragmatic about North Korea and the U.S., focusing on how foreign relations affect their bottom line. One of the deepest regrets Koreans have about history is that their nation’s fate has often been determined by outside forces. It would be tragic for this to be perpetuated by mass indifference to national security and foreign policy. I do not think this will happen. Eventually, circumstances will change in North Korea – hopefully via peaceful transition rather than crisis – and I expect that South Korea, with U.S. support, will take the lead on the Korean Peninsula. With that future at stake, the next generation in South Korea will become more engaged. Meanwhile, Americans should not mind if South Koreans root for the North Korean soccer team; it is more important that South Korean foreign policy continues to root for the alliance with the United States.