Japan's Elections and Relations with the Two Koreas

Today the USC Korean Studies Institute published an interview I did regarding Japan's elections and relations with the two Koreas.

***

Q: The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won enough seats in Japan's legislative election today to form the next government without the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) that has governed Japan for all but 11 months of the last 54 years. What are the general implications of this change in power?

Easley: The election results are testament to the Japanese public's frustration. The LDP was instrumental in realizing Japan's economic miracle and postwar security, but since the burst of Japan's economic bubble and the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, the LDP has struggled to adjust. The Japanese public has been dissatisfied with the pace of progress on various domestic issues, including economic growth and inequality, bureaucratic mismanagement, and coping with Japan's aging society. If the DPJ is able to effectively deal with Japan's domestic challenges, this can strengthen Japan economically and as a security partner, and that would be good news for Washington and Seoul. The trouble is that nearly all the governing experience in Japan and most of the personal relations with diplomats and officials of other countries is held by the LDP. This will put the new DPJ government under enormous pressure to make a good first impression with its Japanese voters, as well as with Japan's international partners.

Q: Japan's relations with South Korea and China have often been plagued by issues of history and memories of war. How will the DPJ handle these historical sensitivities?

Easley: The DPJ has long advocated that Japan seriously reflect on its history and show greater sensitivity to its neighbors' memories of the past. Toward this end, the DPJ may take a more conciliatory position on the content of history textbooks. Regarding Yasukuni Shrine, DPJ President Yukio Hatoyama has pledged not to visit the shrine and that as prime minister he will see that no members of his cabinet go either. The DPJ may pursue the construction of a secular war memorial for Japanese officials to visit instead of Yasukuni. Such gestures would almost certainly be appreciated by the Korean people and other Asian populations.

On the other hand, the DPJ does not sound flexible on Japan's maritime and territorial disputes with its neighbors, promising to remain firm on Japan's claims. Hatoyama has said that these issues [such as the Dokdo/Takeshima island dispute between Tokyo and Seoul] are difficult to resolve bilaterally because if one side is seen as giving concessions, a nationalist backlash would follow. So Hatoyama suggests that these disputes be resolved in the process of developing an "East Asian Community," along a path of regional integration similar to that traversed by the European Union. This sounds good in principle, but will prove very difficult in practice. Nonetheless, it is important to have big cooperative visions to help nations gradually overcome historical issues. In the short-term, a more realistic but still worthy goal for politicians and diplomats will be not allowing historical issues to derail relations or delay urgently needed cooperation on financial stability, human security and the environment.

Q: What about the implications of the election for Japan's policy toward North Korea?

Easley: Hatoyama has mentioned the possibility of restarting talks with North Korea. Much will depend on how the DPJ handles the issue of Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea decades ago. [Several abductees were returned to Japan; some are reported dead, others are still considered missing. The issue has complicated not only Japan's diplomacy with North Korea, but also Tokyo's ability to coordinate policy in the Six-party Talks]. The DPJ may want to focus on North Korea's nuclear program, missiles and potential political-economic instability, but can not appear soft on the abductions issue because of Japanese public opinion and the possibility that the LDP opposition might use the issue against the DPJ. The interaction between Tokyo and Seoul will also be key. The new DPJ government will need to closely coordinate with Seoul on North Korea, but it is also important for Seoul to reassure Tokyo. Japan in particular has legitimate concerns about North Korea's nuclear and missile programs. If South Korean President Lee Myung-bak's administration shows understanding of Tokyo's security concerns, this would facilitate U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral coordination, which in turn could encourage China to be increasingly helpful in pressing for North Korea's cooperation.

Q: What does the advent of a DPJ government mean for the Obama administration's Korea policy?

Easley: President Obama's team and relevant officials at the State Department are well aware of the complicated strategic geometry in dealing with North Korea. They know pushing too hard could spark a military conflict with North Korea or serious break with China [since Beijing wishes to avoid the collateral effects of a collapse of the North Korean regime]. On the other hand, the Obama administration recognizes that taking a soft line at this point would present credibility problems for U.S. alliances and the international nonproliferation regime and undo progress made to date in having the world hold North Korea accountable for its provocative actions. United Nations sanctions are a counter-proliferation device and punish North Korea's breech of its international commitments. In principle, the sanctions should not be eased just because North Korea is willing to talk. It is important to reengage North Korea diplomatically given the opportunity, but President Obama and President Lee said the pattern where North Korea raises tensions and then returns to talks seeking rewards must be broken. The new government in Tokyo will likely agree. The question now is whether Washington, Tokyo and Seoul, working together with Beijing, will stay on the same page to hold North Korea to account – demanding concrete actions from Pyongyang on disarmament in exchange for concrete improvements in economic and diplomatic relations.