Japan-U.S. alliance

I recently attended a meeting of U.S.-Japan alliance managers in San Francisco. Below are several interesting issues raised in discussion, with links to related resources.

One provocative suggestion made at the conference was for a Japan-U.S. FTA. At issue of course would be Japanese market liberalization, especially concerning agricultural protection.
http://www.cfr.org/publication/8058/on_japan.html?breadcrumb=default

Basing issues were discussed within the context of the recent 2+2 agreement and local opposition to force realignment plans. Japanese domestic support for U.S. military bases was called the "weakest link" in the Japan-U.S. alliance, requiring greater attention from both sides.
http://www.eastwestcenter.org/res-pr-detail.asp?resproj_ID=159

With the recent trend of upgrading the alliance, the old question of "will Japan become the UK of Asia?" resurfaced. Opinions differed, but it was clear that dialogue about the alliance was much more "values based" than years past. Shared values were cited as a basis for broadening and deepening the alliance's roles and missions. It was also pointed out that speaking of "values" may be a politically correct, less threatening way to address mutual Japan-U.S. concerns over China.
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/v05n03_pdf[1].pdf

Related to my remarks on Japanese hard vs. soft power, many participants argued that Japan has "international political capital" to spend, particularly by weighing in on global security issues. http://www.globescan.com/news_archives/bbcpoll06-3.html

In a noted departure from the so-called "reactionary" security policies of the past (where Japan was primarily seen to be responding to American gaiatsu), at this meeting many Japanese delegates expressed an active desire on the part of Japan to be more involved, for example, in nuclear negotiations with Iran.
http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=3742555


This elicited American comments implying "be careful what you wish for" and speculation about what greater international security role Japan desires. Some Japanese delegates suggested that the U.S. is not being supportive enough of Japan's UNSC bid (http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/reform/index.html). Others suggested Japan act as a "thought leader" for the region (seemingly in reference to Foreign Minister Aso's recent speech).

In discussions of Japanese international contribution and regional leadership, of course the Yasukuni issue came up, (see related postings). The concern expressed by many Japanese delegates was that the Yasukuni controversy is giving China the "moral high ground" to expand its influence in Southeast Asia.
http://www.japanfocus.org/article.asp?id=414

American participants often cited the importance of paying more attention to India. It is no coincidence that the Bush administration is upgrading diplomatic efforts with India with a focus on economic and nuclear cooperation.
http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_progj/task,view/id,526/

Finally, what I consider the major open questions of the conference: looking forward, what are Japan's comfortable limits on international security missions (humanitarian operations, UN-sanctioned interventions, collective defense, rear area support for coalitions of the willing?) and to what extent is the U.S. comfortable with Japan engaging in more independent foreign/security policies (concerning normalization with the DPRK, Iran nuclear and energy negotiations, China policy, etc.)? In other words, what are reasonable expectations for future U.S.-Japan security cooperation and where might Japanese and American national interests diverge?

The Bush-Koizumi partnership appears rock solid and resolved to push the alliance forward (and sweep bad news under the carpet). So it may be until the next administrations take over in Washington and Tokyo that we are able to answer these questions.