U.S.-Japan-China relations

I recently attended a meeting of security specialists from China, Japan and the U.S. Below are what I considered the highlights of the conference.

1. The Yasukuni issue was discussed at length as a stumbling block in Sino-Japanese relations. For resolving the issue, many looked to the post-Koizumi era. Others suggested some intervention by the United States. But there was no consensus on what the U.S. could do. Tokyo and Beijing each wants Washington to weigh in on its side, and for obvious reasons, it would be difficult for the U.S. to play the role of unbiased intermediary. It seemed to most participants that the U.S. has more to lose than gain by getting involved and that the issue would be best addressed by Japan and China themselves. But Japanese leaders are not willing to back down because of China, presently seeing no face-saving exit on the history issue or end to Chinese criticisms. And Chinese leaders appear unwilling to give up the moral stick as long as criticizing Japan plays well at home and while any headline suggesting Chinese capitulation may incite a nationalist backlash. It appears the issue will remain intractable until both sides can tacitly agree to ratchet down the rhetoric and move forward on more substantive issues in the bilateral relationship.

2. Different strategic visions of the region were discussed. It remained unclear how much overlap or tension exists among the three major visions outlined: U.S. hegemonic stability, China’s new security concept, and ASEAN driven regional integration. The expansion of the Six Party Talks mechanism was seen as a possibility, but prospects for moving beyond the current nuclear impasse appear low at present. There was an apparent consensus among participants that the vision of the region must include increased national openness, deeper meaningful interdependence, and concerted efforts for stability. Economic nationalism (protectionism) and backlashes to globalization were identified as real dangers. It was pointed out that Franco-German reconciliation was embedded in European regionalization, suggesting that better Sino-Japanese relations may require a deeper institutional context, especially given the current historical experiment of simultaneously strong Chinese and Japanese nations.

3. This fed into discussions of East Asia community building. In my view, the major debate here was over the role of values. How important are shared values to community building? Some participants thought community building should proceed based on shared interests (especially economic interests as in APEC and ASEAN) and allow for diverse and even contradictory value systems (“harmony in diversity”). Others argued that community building without shared values would ultimately be shallow and lead to conflict. Some participants questioned how serious the United States is about democracy promotion, while others suggested this would be over-reaching for the U.S., and to the extent Japan is involved, may encourage diplomatic isolation of Tokyo in the region. Perhaps rather than revisit the “Asian values” debate of the 1990s, it would be more productive to look ahead to how and why particular actors’ international (and domestic political) norms may eventually prevail in the regionalization process.

4. This raises the question of regional leadership. Interestingly, there appears to be a competition among the three countries to avoid the designation of regional leader. American participants avoided describing the role of the U.S. as hegemon and instead focused on U.S. efforts to work with allies to stabilize the region and for engaging (in stark contrast to containing) China. Chinese participants argued that Beijing is necessarily focused on economic development and is happy to work with Washington on security issues and leave the driving of regional integration to ASEAN. Japanese participants suggested that Japan seeks not regional leadership but the respect and status it deserves, and the acceptance and support of the means by which it can make further contributions to regional and global prosperity. In sum, all sides were politically savvy and strategic in presenting their country’s views on regional leadership. Perhaps it would be useful to address the matter from a different angle at a future conference, for example, by considering the international political initiatives on offer by each government and how these ideas are resonating and finding support in other capitals.

5. At this conference, many Japanese and American participants seemed impressed with the ideas and recommendations advanced by several Chinese participants. These included:
- supporting greater Taiwan participation in regional/global affairs
- Chinese freeing themselves from a victim’s mentality
- Chinese education and press presenting a more balanced historical view of Japan
- PRC leadership telling their people how Japan normalized relations with China before Washington had formal diplomatic relations with Beijing, how Japan played an important role in China’s economic development (through investment, business models, technology transfer), and how Japan was the first country to raise sanctions after Tiananmen.
- build a national memorial museum focused on the Cultural Revolution
- cultivate people-people exchanges and warm feelings toward Japan
These statements were of course made by individuals in their own capacity (not representing organizations, the party or the government) but many attendees at the conference were impressed that these points were outlined and articulated so clearly. This appeared to reflect 1) a diverse and congenial gathering of experts far from their respective capitals, 2) how some certain issues were rarely if ever raised at the conference, i.e. Taiwan or the "China threat" and 3) greater confidence, balance and sophistication in the Chinese position.

6. Finally, key points were made at the conference about the need to build crisis management capacity between Japan and China. Specifically, concerns were expressed about the possibility of a Sino-Japanese naval dispute over islands, resources or territorial waters. To prevent a miscalculation at sea escalating to an international crisis, calls were made for better Sino-Japanese mil-mil and government-government communication. In particular, it was suggested that mechanisms be implemented in terms of maritime codes of conduct, rules of engagement and crisis management as soon as possible.