Today the Washington Post published a letter I wrote about historical reconciliation and East Asian security.
***
Japan's Difficult Reconciliation
Tuesday, August 22, 2006; Page A14
G. John Ikenberry's Aug. 17 op-ed, "Japan's History Problem," provides excellent analysis but misses three key points.
First, Japanese normalization and historical reconciliation are not entirely at cross-purposes. Revising Article 9 of Japan's constitution to make the Japanese military legal, while Tokyo continues to disavow offensive capabilities, would bring Japanese law in line with reality. Constitutional reform is important for making Japan's defense policy and contributions to international security trustworthy and legitimate.
Second, the history problem in Asia is not just Japan's problem. China and Korea have biased nationalist histories to address as well. Moreover, while apologies and conciliatory behavior from Tokyo may remove the most immediate obstacles to cooperation with China and Korea, this is a long way from these countries accepting Japanese leadership. South Korea and the United States may share national interests with a more engaged Japan, but it is doubtful that China will see an elevated Japanese role as in its interest, no matter what Tokyo does to bury the past.
Finally, East Asia is not Europe. Europe is filled with democracies and has no North Korea. Even so, Russia is far from becoming a member of NATO or the European Union. Achieving an East Asian security organization inclusive of China would be a great asset to regional peace. But different regional contexts may call for different paths to integration.
For the United States, regional security in East Asia is best pursued by expanding the sphere of cooperation centered on strong alliances, built during the Cold War and transformed to meet contemporary international challenges.
LEIF-ERIC EASLEY
Cambridge, Mass.
Tuesday, August 22, 2006
Friday, August 18, 2006
Remembering September 11
Today the Asia Times published a letter I wrote about the purpose and meaning of the new film World Trade Center.
***
Contrary to Ruth Rosen's analysis (Great movie, pity about the Big Lie, Aug 18), I found World Trade Center to be carefully and respectfully detached from politics. While misperceptions about the war on terror are important to address in public debate, I don't see why it should be Oliver Stone's job to tell America how related or unrelated Iraq is to September 11 [2001]. The movie is not a documentary on global politics. It consciously stays above the fray of war spin from Republicans and Democrats. The movie's short portrayals of [US President George W] Bush and [former New York mayor Rudolph] Giuliani could have glorified them or criticized them, but does neither. This movie is politically neutral. While keeping more or less true to the facts of that horrible day, it focuses on terribly trying personal experiences, purposely steering clear of controversial historical and political context. Why? Because the film aims to capture the events of just one single day, a day that will remain seared into the psyche of Americans for a long long time. The message of the movie is not a political one but a human one: people are capable of horrible things, but they are also capable of compassion, sacrifice and unity of purpose. On September 11, that compassion, sacrifice and unity were not for any political end but for the sake of what is right, and ultimately, what's worth living for: the good of humanity.
***
Contrary to Ruth Rosen's analysis (Great movie, pity about the Big Lie, Aug 18), I found World Trade Center to be carefully and respectfully detached from politics. While misperceptions about the war on terror are important to address in public debate, I don't see why it should be Oliver Stone's job to tell America how related or unrelated Iraq is to September 11 [2001]. The movie is not a documentary on global politics. It consciously stays above the fray of war spin from Republicans and Democrats. The movie's short portrayals of [US President George W] Bush and [former New York mayor Rudolph] Giuliani could have glorified them or criticized them, but does neither. This movie is politically neutral. While keeping more or less true to the facts of that horrible day, it focuses on terribly trying personal experiences, purposely steering clear of controversial historical and political context. Why? Because the film aims to capture the events of just one single day, a day that will remain seared into the psyche of Americans for a long long time. The message of the movie is not a political one but a human one: people are capable of horrible things, but they are also capable of compassion, sacrifice and unity of purpose. On September 11, that compassion, sacrifice and unity were not for any political end but for the sake of what is right, and ultimately, what's worth living for: the good of humanity.
Tuesday, July 25, 2006
Engaging North Korea
The article below was published in the PacNet Newsletter, Vol. 8, No. 32A, July 24, 2006, and reprinted in the Jakarta Post and GLOCOM Japan; an earlier version appears in the Korea Times.
***
Building trust or giving it away? The Roh Administration’s engagement of the North
by Leif-Eric Easley
South Korean President Roh Moo-Hyun’s engagement policy of the North is facing serious challenges. North Korea’s provocative missile tests on July 5 met with unanimous condemnation by the United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1695 requires sanctions on missile-related transfers to North Korea and demands Pyongyang suspend its ballistic missile activities. One month earlier in South Korean elections, President Roh’s Uri Party was trounced by the opposition Grand National Party which favors a tougher line on North Korea. These developments place Roh’s engagement policy under both international and domestic pressure, renewing debate over how Seoul manages its relations with Pyongyang.
Since coming to office in 2003, President Roh’s approach has been widely considered either a policy of appeasement or a bold effort to build inter-Korean trust. The logic of appeasement says rather than confront Pyongyang militarily (very costly) or diplomatically hold it accountable for its behavior (potentially costly in the event of a North Korean collapse), better to bribe North Korea and avoid it becoming even more of a problem. This strategy would be rational, weighing expected costs and benefits, except that appeasement has historically proven to simply delay conflict. Most of President Roh’s critics object to his North Korea policy as charting this path toward failure.
Proponents of the Roh approach argue that trust building is essential for North-South reconciliation and eventual reunification. A “see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil” policy works much better than an “axis of evil” policy because it helps establish effective working relations based on trust. At some stage mutual trust will require a shared concept of Korean identity and comparable visions of what a unified Korean Peninsula will look like. But for now, building trust between North and South means getting to a point where the two can depend on each other to make good on their commitments, regardless of what third countries (especially the United States and China) say or do. This is the kind of trust the Roh administration has tried to establish, and costly signaling via unconditional engagement is arguably a good way of doing it.
The question then, is whether the policy is working. Have years of “sunshine” actually built trust with the North, and if so, at what cost? North-South contacts and exchanges have markedly increased, and while often delayed by Pyongyang, historical patterns of postponement and fiery rhetoric have tempered. South Korean aid to the North has grown unabated but is often not confirmed to reach intended recipients. The Kaesong Industrial Zone brought inter-Korean trade to unprecedented levels, despite the North demanding concessions while backtracking on commitments. South Korean tourism to the North and separated family meetings expanded, although Pyongyang showed little cooperation regarding South Korean POWs and abductees. There were high hopes for a visit to the North by former President Kim Dae-Jung on rail links severed since the Korean War, but these remained blocked by the North Korean army. Military confidence building between North and South made little progress and the Six-Party Talks addressing North Korea’s nuclear programs have been stalled for nearly a year.
While it is not clear whether the Roh administration’s policy has built significant trust with North Korea, it has clearly damaged trust within the South Korea-U.S. alliance. Systematic efforts by the Roh administration to downplay the North Korean threat reduce U.S. confidence in the ROK and undermine public perceptions of the alliance in South Korea. Statements made by Roh administration officials suggesting the U.S. is as much the problem as North Korea in the nuclear standoff raise eyebrows in Washington. All this interacts poorly with U.S. global force restructuring and strategic flexibility doctrine, which in turn erodes South Korean trust in the alliance.
The Roh administration’s pursuit of a policy with uncertain benefits and obvious costs implies a wager: that in the long-term, trust with North Korea is more important than trust with the U.S., and improving one naturally comes at the expense of the other. Such a wager is understandable if one’s passion is for an independent unified Korea. But what if South Korea’s relations with North Korea and the U.S. need not be managed in zero-sum terms? Does building North-South trust really require Seoul to distance itself from Washington? A South Korean policy that holds Pyongyang more accountable for its actions and restores South Korea-U.S. confidence might actually raise the effectiveness of engagement because North Korean reciprocity is ultimately necessary for mutual trust on the Korean Peninsula.
After years of nearly unconditional engagement, Seoul has gained leverage in dealing with the North. The Roh administration is now considering putting this leverage to use. During inter-Korean economic cooperation talks one week after the South Korean elections, Seoul departed from previous negotiations by stipulating a precondition: South Korea would provide additional aid to the North only after the cross-border railway tests cancelled by Pyongyang are rescheduled. In North-South ministerial talks after the missile tests, South Korea warned against any further provocations and declined all North Korean requests for economic assistance. The North responded by walking out of the meetings. This developing situation calls for a recalibration of Seoul’s engagement policy.
While South Korea can usefully exercise leverage over the North, care is needed to avoid squandering this leverage and increasing mistrust. The delicate balance will be to keep channels of communication open with Pyongyang while demanding greater reciprocity. One way to do this is by continuing rice and fertilizer aid and economic cooperation at the Kaesong Industrial Zone while making some assistance, such as grants and loans for North Korean light industries, contingent on Pyongyang’s actions. Seoul can also make clear what further economic cooperation is possible once North Korea returns to the Six-Party Talks.
To help maintain trust with other nations, Seoul can restart the South Korea-Japan-U.S. policy consultation meetings known as the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG). Disputes over history in ROK-Japan relations have caused this important consultation mechanism to lie dormant for three years. Meanwhile, Washington and Tokyo have gone on coordinating policy without Seoul in the room. Better for South Korea to take every opportunity to have its interests represented in policies concerning North Korea.
Enhanced coordination among South Korea, Japan and the U.S. can bring North Korea back to the table. But if Pyongyang refuses to rejoin the Six-Party Talks, five-way talks could be held for the purpose of drawing up “red lines” for North Korean behavior – such as performing a nuclear test or firing missiles over another country – and how these would be met with concerted action by the five parties.
Unconditional engagement of North Korea has yielded uncertain benefits and clear costs, and appears out of step with international diplomacy as well as South Korean public opinion. Now is time for the Roh administration to recalibrate its engagement policy to build trust without giving it away.
***
Building trust or giving it away? The Roh Administration’s engagement of the North
by Leif-Eric Easley
South Korean President Roh Moo-Hyun’s engagement policy of the North is facing serious challenges. North Korea’s provocative missile tests on July 5 met with unanimous condemnation by the United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1695 requires sanctions on missile-related transfers to North Korea and demands Pyongyang suspend its ballistic missile activities. One month earlier in South Korean elections, President Roh’s Uri Party was trounced by the opposition Grand National Party which favors a tougher line on North Korea. These developments place Roh’s engagement policy under both international and domestic pressure, renewing debate over how Seoul manages its relations with Pyongyang.
Since coming to office in 2003, President Roh’s approach has been widely considered either a policy of appeasement or a bold effort to build inter-Korean trust. The logic of appeasement says rather than confront Pyongyang militarily (very costly) or diplomatically hold it accountable for its behavior (potentially costly in the event of a North Korean collapse), better to bribe North Korea and avoid it becoming even more of a problem. This strategy would be rational, weighing expected costs and benefits, except that appeasement has historically proven to simply delay conflict. Most of President Roh’s critics object to his North Korea policy as charting this path toward failure.
Proponents of the Roh approach argue that trust building is essential for North-South reconciliation and eventual reunification. A “see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil” policy works much better than an “axis of evil” policy because it helps establish effective working relations based on trust. At some stage mutual trust will require a shared concept of Korean identity and comparable visions of what a unified Korean Peninsula will look like. But for now, building trust between North and South means getting to a point where the two can depend on each other to make good on their commitments, regardless of what third countries (especially the United States and China) say or do. This is the kind of trust the Roh administration has tried to establish, and costly signaling via unconditional engagement is arguably a good way of doing it.
The question then, is whether the policy is working. Have years of “sunshine” actually built trust with the North, and if so, at what cost? North-South contacts and exchanges have markedly increased, and while often delayed by Pyongyang, historical patterns of postponement and fiery rhetoric have tempered. South Korean aid to the North has grown unabated but is often not confirmed to reach intended recipients. The Kaesong Industrial Zone brought inter-Korean trade to unprecedented levels, despite the North demanding concessions while backtracking on commitments. South Korean tourism to the North and separated family meetings expanded, although Pyongyang showed little cooperation regarding South Korean POWs and abductees. There were high hopes for a visit to the North by former President Kim Dae-Jung on rail links severed since the Korean War, but these remained blocked by the North Korean army. Military confidence building between North and South made little progress and the Six-Party Talks addressing North Korea’s nuclear programs have been stalled for nearly a year.
While it is not clear whether the Roh administration’s policy has built significant trust with North Korea, it has clearly damaged trust within the South Korea-U.S. alliance. Systematic efforts by the Roh administration to downplay the North Korean threat reduce U.S. confidence in the ROK and undermine public perceptions of the alliance in South Korea. Statements made by Roh administration officials suggesting the U.S. is as much the problem as North Korea in the nuclear standoff raise eyebrows in Washington. All this interacts poorly with U.S. global force restructuring and strategic flexibility doctrine, which in turn erodes South Korean trust in the alliance.
The Roh administration’s pursuit of a policy with uncertain benefits and obvious costs implies a wager: that in the long-term, trust with North Korea is more important than trust with the U.S., and improving one naturally comes at the expense of the other. Such a wager is understandable if one’s passion is for an independent unified Korea. But what if South Korea’s relations with North Korea and the U.S. need not be managed in zero-sum terms? Does building North-South trust really require Seoul to distance itself from Washington? A South Korean policy that holds Pyongyang more accountable for its actions and restores South Korea-U.S. confidence might actually raise the effectiveness of engagement because North Korean reciprocity is ultimately necessary for mutual trust on the Korean Peninsula.
After years of nearly unconditional engagement, Seoul has gained leverage in dealing with the North. The Roh administration is now considering putting this leverage to use. During inter-Korean economic cooperation talks one week after the South Korean elections, Seoul departed from previous negotiations by stipulating a precondition: South Korea would provide additional aid to the North only after the cross-border railway tests cancelled by Pyongyang are rescheduled. In North-South ministerial talks after the missile tests, South Korea warned against any further provocations and declined all North Korean requests for economic assistance. The North responded by walking out of the meetings. This developing situation calls for a recalibration of Seoul’s engagement policy.
While South Korea can usefully exercise leverage over the North, care is needed to avoid squandering this leverage and increasing mistrust. The delicate balance will be to keep channels of communication open with Pyongyang while demanding greater reciprocity. One way to do this is by continuing rice and fertilizer aid and economic cooperation at the Kaesong Industrial Zone while making some assistance, such as grants and loans for North Korean light industries, contingent on Pyongyang’s actions. Seoul can also make clear what further economic cooperation is possible once North Korea returns to the Six-Party Talks.
To help maintain trust with other nations, Seoul can restart the South Korea-Japan-U.S. policy consultation meetings known as the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG). Disputes over history in ROK-Japan relations have caused this important consultation mechanism to lie dormant for three years. Meanwhile, Washington and Tokyo have gone on coordinating policy without Seoul in the room. Better for South Korea to take every opportunity to have its interests represented in policies concerning North Korea.
Enhanced coordination among South Korea, Japan and the U.S. can bring North Korea back to the table. But if Pyongyang refuses to rejoin the Six-Party Talks, five-way talks could be held for the purpose of drawing up “red lines” for North Korean behavior – such as performing a nuclear test or firing missiles over another country – and how these would be met with concerted action by the five parties.
Unconditional engagement of North Korea has yielded uncertain benefits and clear costs, and appears out of step with international diplomacy as well as South Korean public opinion. Now is time for the Roh administration to recalibrate its engagement policy to build trust without giving it away.
Monday, June 05, 2006
South Korea-U.S. alliance
I recently attended a track II dialogue on the state of the U.S.-ROK alliance. I found the following to be the key points of the meeting.
- The international security environment saw a process of redefinition after the Cold War, later punctuated by September 11th. Redefining international security means broadening the U.S.-ROK alliance. But it also means the need for compromise on how the U.S. wants to resolve matters like North Korea.
- Interesting things happen when international relations theory meets reality. Perhaps this is at root of some South Korea-U.S. disagreements. President Bush pushes the democratic peace theory, President Roh pushes neo-liberal, functionalist integration theory. The two administrations are working off different assumptions and neither president’s policies actually fit their theory.
- The current international tension among states comes from the U.S. moving on to a 21st century vision of international politics (focused on human security) while others still prefer the Westphalian system (based on state sovereignty). The pressing question for Asia then, is whether the Chinese value system, development model and nonintervention principle will compete with the U.S. vision?
- Lee Jung-suk taking over as Unification Minister does not represent policy change. He is however, more focused on new developments in ROK-China relations. Progressives say China is colonizing North Korea through increasing investment, trying to make North Korea the fourth province of northeast China; their conclusion: U.S. needs to get softer on North Korea. Conservatives agree China is colonizing North Korea but come to a very different conclusion: Seoul can’t trust Beijing and must work closer with Washington.
- It is a mistake to attribute strains in the alliance simply to the Bush-Roh dynamic. International structural conditions and especially the landscape of Korean domestic politics have changed since there was last a conservative party in control of the Blue House. It is thus a false hope to think that the alliance will return to the "good ol' days" if a GNP president is elected.
- The Bush administration sees the Six Party Talks as a waste of time until North Korea decides to give up its nukes. So the U.S. has switched from a sequential to parallel approach, also focusing on areas where the DPRK has hostile policies toward the U.S. (counterfeiting, trafficking of illicit cargo) and taking action through alternative mechanisms. But the Six Party Talks are unlikely to fall apart: all sides want to keep a ceiling on conflict, China does not want to loose face, the U.S. does not want to lose leverage of multiple actors and North Korea doesn’t want to lose a way out.
- Several interesting points were offered on the topic of anti-Americanism in South Korea:
* Many newspapers (where the older generation gets their news) are conservative, many television and internet media (where the younger generation gets their news) are very liberal.
* Anti-Americans are a vocal minority; 386 generation is exceptional (protest culture, not very internationalized) but important because they are distorting history in Korean education system (via policymaking, teachers unions).
* Media gives distorted perspective by over-covering radical anti-American activists, NGOs.
* Divide between U.S. and ROK is more between their leaderships than between their societies.
* Anti-Americanism is a threat to the alliance to the extent that U.S. policymakers take newspaper reports too seriously, see Korea as ungrateful and advocate its abandonment.
* But while anti-Americanism may not be pervasive, if it flares up during a campaign, it can change the outcome of the election.
* Need to recognize and further study different kinds of anti-Americanism: anti-U.S. foreign policy very different from anti-Americanization (associated with globalization).
Finally, here are what I consider the most important unanswered questions from the meeting:
1. How would Koreans like the U.S.-ROK alliance to look different from the U.S.-Japan alliance?
2. How do changing Korean perceptions of China compare to changing American perceptions of China?
3. How to productively address the status of Kaesong in the KORUS FTA negotiations?
- The international security environment saw a process of redefinition after the Cold War, later punctuated by September 11th. Redefining international security means broadening the U.S.-ROK alliance. But it also means the need for compromise on how the U.S. wants to resolve matters like North Korea.
- Interesting things happen when international relations theory meets reality. Perhaps this is at root of some South Korea-U.S. disagreements. President Bush pushes the democratic peace theory, President Roh pushes neo-liberal, functionalist integration theory. The two administrations are working off different assumptions and neither president’s policies actually fit their theory.
- The current international tension among states comes from the U.S. moving on to a 21st century vision of international politics (focused on human security) while others still prefer the Westphalian system (based on state sovereignty). The pressing question for Asia then, is whether the Chinese value system, development model and nonintervention principle will compete with the U.S. vision?
- Lee Jung-suk taking over as Unification Minister does not represent policy change. He is however, more focused on new developments in ROK-China relations. Progressives say China is colonizing North Korea through increasing investment, trying to make North Korea the fourth province of northeast China; their conclusion: U.S. needs to get softer on North Korea. Conservatives agree China is colonizing North Korea but come to a very different conclusion: Seoul can’t trust Beijing and must work closer with Washington.
- It is a mistake to attribute strains in the alliance simply to the Bush-Roh dynamic. International structural conditions and especially the landscape of Korean domestic politics have changed since there was last a conservative party in control of the Blue House. It is thus a false hope to think that the alliance will return to the "good ol' days" if a GNP president is elected.
- The Bush administration sees the Six Party Talks as a waste of time until North Korea decides to give up its nukes. So the U.S. has switched from a sequential to parallel approach, also focusing on areas where the DPRK has hostile policies toward the U.S. (counterfeiting, trafficking of illicit cargo) and taking action through alternative mechanisms. But the Six Party Talks are unlikely to fall apart: all sides want to keep a ceiling on conflict, China does not want to loose face, the U.S. does not want to lose leverage of multiple actors and North Korea doesn’t want to lose a way out.
- Several interesting points were offered on the topic of anti-Americanism in South Korea:
* Many newspapers (where the older generation gets their news) are conservative, many television and internet media (where the younger generation gets their news) are very liberal.
* Anti-Americans are a vocal minority; 386 generation is exceptional (protest culture, not very internationalized) but important because they are distorting history in Korean education system (via policymaking, teachers unions).
* Media gives distorted perspective by over-covering radical anti-American activists, NGOs.
* Divide between U.S. and ROK is more between their leaderships than between their societies.
* Anti-Americanism is a threat to the alliance to the extent that U.S. policymakers take newspaper reports too seriously, see Korea as ungrateful and advocate its abandonment.
* But while anti-Americanism may not be pervasive, if it flares up during a campaign, it can change the outcome of the election.
* Need to recognize and further study different kinds of anti-Americanism: anti-U.S. foreign policy very different from anti-Americanization (associated with globalization).
Finally, here are what I consider the most important unanswered questions from the meeting:
1. How would Koreans like the U.S.-ROK alliance to look different from the U.S.-Japan alliance?
2. How do changing Korean perceptions of China compare to changing American perceptions of China?
3. How to productively address the status of Kaesong in the KORUS FTA negotiations?
Monday, April 10, 2006
U.S.-Japan-China relations
I recently attended a meeting of security specialists from China, Japan and the U.S. Below are what I considered the highlights of the conference.
1. The Yasukuni issue was discussed at length as a stumbling block in Sino-Japanese relations. For resolving the issue, many looked to the post-Koizumi era. Others suggested some intervention by the United States. But there was no consensus on what the U.S. could do. Tokyo and Beijing each wants Washington to weigh in on its side, and for obvious reasons, it would be difficult for the U.S. to play the role of unbiased intermediary. It seemed to most participants that the U.S. has more to lose than gain by getting involved and that the issue would be best addressed by Japan and China themselves. But Japanese leaders are not willing to back down because of China, presently seeing no face-saving exit on the history issue or end to Chinese criticisms. And Chinese leaders appear unwilling to give up the moral stick as long as criticizing Japan plays well at home and while any headline suggesting Chinese capitulation may incite a nationalist backlash. It appears the issue will remain intractable until both sides can tacitly agree to ratchet down the rhetoric and move forward on more substantive issues in the bilateral relationship.
2. Different strategic visions of the region were discussed. It remained unclear how much overlap or tension exists among the three major visions outlined: U.S. hegemonic stability, China’s new security concept, and ASEAN driven regional integration. The expansion of the Six Party Talks mechanism was seen as a possibility, but prospects for moving beyond the current nuclear impasse appear low at present. There was an apparent consensus among participants that the vision of the region must include increased national openness, deeper meaningful interdependence, and concerted efforts for stability. Economic nationalism (protectionism) and backlashes to globalization were identified as real dangers. It was pointed out that Franco-German reconciliation was embedded in European regionalization, suggesting that better Sino-Japanese relations may require a deeper institutional context, especially given the current historical experiment of simultaneously strong Chinese and Japanese nations.
3. This fed into discussions of East Asia community building. In my view, the major debate here was over the role of values. How important are shared values to community building? Some participants thought community building should proceed based on shared interests (especially economic interests as in APEC and ASEAN) and allow for diverse and even contradictory value systems (“harmony in diversity”). Others argued that community building without shared values would ultimately be shallow and lead to conflict. Some participants questioned how serious the United States is about democracy promotion, while others suggested this would be over-reaching for the U.S., and to the extent Japan is involved, may encourage diplomatic isolation of Tokyo in the region. Perhaps rather than revisit the “Asian values” debate of the 1990s, it would be more productive to look ahead to how and why particular actors’ international (and domestic political) norms may eventually prevail in the regionalization process.
4. This raises the question of regional leadership. Interestingly, there appears to be a competition among the three countries to avoid the designation of regional leader. American participants avoided describing the role of the U.S. as hegemon and instead focused on U.S. efforts to work with allies to stabilize the region and for engaging (in stark contrast to containing) China. Chinese participants argued that Beijing is necessarily focused on economic development and is happy to work with Washington on security issues and leave the driving of regional integration to ASEAN. Japanese participants suggested that Japan seeks not regional leadership but the respect and status it deserves, and the acceptance and support of the means by which it can make further contributions to regional and global prosperity. In sum, all sides were politically savvy and strategic in presenting their country’s views on regional leadership. Perhaps it would be useful to address the matter from a different angle at a future conference, for example, by considering the international political initiatives on offer by each government and how these ideas are resonating and finding support in other capitals.
5. At this conference, many Japanese and American participants seemed impressed with the ideas and recommendations advanced by several Chinese participants. These included:
- supporting greater Taiwan participation in regional/global affairs
- Chinese freeing themselves from a victim’s mentality
- Chinese education and press presenting a more balanced historical view of Japan
- PRC leadership telling their people how Japan normalized relations with China before Washington had formal diplomatic relations with Beijing, how Japan played an important role in China’s economic development (through investment, business models, technology transfer), and how Japan was the first country to raise sanctions after Tiananmen.
- build a national memorial museum focused on the Cultural Revolution
- cultivate people-people exchanges and warm feelings toward Japan
These statements were of course made by individuals in their own capacity (not representing organizations, the party or the government) but many attendees at the conference were impressed that these points were outlined and articulated so clearly. This appeared to reflect 1) a diverse and congenial gathering of experts far from their respective capitals, 2) how some certain issues were rarely if ever raised at the conference, i.e. Taiwan or the "China threat" and 3) greater confidence, balance and sophistication in the Chinese position.
6. Finally, key points were made at the conference about the need to build crisis management capacity between Japan and China. Specifically, concerns were expressed about the possibility of a Sino-Japanese naval dispute over islands, resources or territorial waters. To prevent a miscalculation at sea escalating to an international crisis, calls were made for better Sino-Japanese mil-mil and government-government communication. In particular, it was suggested that mechanisms be implemented in terms of maritime codes of conduct, rules of engagement and crisis management as soon as possible.
1. The Yasukuni issue was discussed at length as a stumbling block in Sino-Japanese relations. For resolving the issue, many looked to the post-Koizumi era. Others suggested some intervention by the United States. But there was no consensus on what the U.S. could do. Tokyo and Beijing each wants Washington to weigh in on its side, and for obvious reasons, it would be difficult for the U.S. to play the role of unbiased intermediary. It seemed to most participants that the U.S. has more to lose than gain by getting involved and that the issue would be best addressed by Japan and China themselves. But Japanese leaders are not willing to back down because of China, presently seeing no face-saving exit on the history issue or end to Chinese criticisms. And Chinese leaders appear unwilling to give up the moral stick as long as criticizing Japan plays well at home and while any headline suggesting Chinese capitulation may incite a nationalist backlash. It appears the issue will remain intractable until both sides can tacitly agree to ratchet down the rhetoric and move forward on more substantive issues in the bilateral relationship.
2. Different strategic visions of the region were discussed. It remained unclear how much overlap or tension exists among the three major visions outlined: U.S. hegemonic stability, China’s new security concept, and ASEAN driven regional integration. The expansion of the Six Party Talks mechanism was seen as a possibility, but prospects for moving beyond the current nuclear impasse appear low at present. There was an apparent consensus among participants that the vision of the region must include increased national openness, deeper meaningful interdependence, and concerted efforts for stability. Economic nationalism (protectionism) and backlashes to globalization were identified as real dangers. It was pointed out that Franco-German reconciliation was embedded in European regionalization, suggesting that better Sino-Japanese relations may require a deeper institutional context, especially given the current historical experiment of simultaneously strong Chinese and Japanese nations.
3. This fed into discussions of East Asia community building. In my view, the major debate here was over the role of values. How important are shared values to community building? Some participants thought community building should proceed based on shared interests (especially economic interests as in APEC and ASEAN) and allow for diverse and even contradictory value systems (“harmony in diversity”). Others argued that community building without shared values would ultimately be shallow and lead to conflict. Some participants questioned how serious the United States is about democracy promotion, while others suggested this would be over-reaching for the U.S., and to the extent Japan is involved, may encourage diplomatic isolation of Tokyo in the region. Perhaps rather than revisit the “Asian values” debate of the 1990s, it would be more productive to look ahead to how and why particular actors’ international (and domestic political) norms may eventually prevail in the regionalization process.
4. This raises the question of regional leadership. Interestingly, there appears to be a competition among the three countries to avoid the designation of regional leader. American participants avoided describing the role of the U.S. as hegemon and instead focused on U.S. efforts to work with allies to stabilize the region and for engaging (in stark contrast to containing) China. Chinese participants argued that Beijing is necessarily focused on economic development and is happy to work with Washington on security issues and leave the driving of regional integration to ASEAN. Japanese participants suggested that Japan seeks not regional leadership but the respect and status it deserves, and the acceptance and support of the means by which it can make further contributions to regional and global prosperity. In sum, all sides were politically savvy and strategic in presenting their country’s views on regional leadership. Perhaps it would be useful to address the matter from a different angle at a future conference, for example, by considering the international political initiatives on offer by each government and how these ideas are resonating and finding support in other capitals.
5. At this conference, many Japanese and American participants seemed impressed with the ideas and recommendations advanced by several Chinese participants. These included:
- supporting greater Taiwan participation in regional/global affairs
- Chinese freeing themselves from a victim’s mentality
- Chinese education and press presenting a more balanced historical view of Japan
- PRC leadership telling their people how Japan normalized relations with China before Washington had formal diplomatic relations with Beijing, how Japan played an important role in China’s economic development (through investment, business models, technology transfer), and how Japan was the first country to raise sanctions after Tiananmen.
- build a national memorial museum focused on the Cultural Revolution
- cultivate people-people exchanges and warm feelings toward Japan
These statements were of course made by individuals in their own capacity (not representing organizations, the party or the government) but many attendees at the conference were impressed that these points were outlined and articulated so clearly. This appeared to reflect 1) a diverse and congenial gathering of experts far from their respective capitals, 2) how some certain issues were rarely if ever raised at the conference, i.e. Taiwan or the "China threat" and 3) greater confidence, balance and sophistication in the Chinese position.
6. Finally, key points were made at the conference about the need to build crisis management capacity between Japan and China. Specifically, concerns were expressed about the possibility of a Sino-Japanese naval dispute over islands, resources or territorial waters. To prevent a miscalculation at sea escalating to an international crisis, calls were made for better Sino-Japanese mil-mil and government-government communication. In particular, it was suggested that mechanisms be implemented in terms of maritime codes of conduct, rules of engagement and crisis management as soon as possible.
Monday, March 06, 2006
Japan-U.S. alliance
I recently attended a meeting of U.S.-Japan alliance managers in San Francisco. Below are several interesting issues raised in discussion, with links to related resources.
One provocative suggestion made at the conference was for a Japan-U.S. FTA. At issue of course would be Japanese market liberalization, especially concerning agricultural protection.
http://www.cfr.org/publication/8058/on_japan.html?breadcrumb=default
Basing issues were discussed within the context of the recent 2+2 agreement and local opposition to force realignment plans. Japanese domestic support for U.S. military bases was called the "weakest link" in the Japan-U.S. alliance, requiring greater attention from both sides.
http://www.eastwestcenter.org/res-pr-detail.asp?resproj_ID=159
With the recent trend of upgrading the alliance, the old question of "will Japan become the UK of Asia?" resurfaced. Opinions differed, but it was clear that dialogue about the alliance was much more "values based" than years past. Shared values were cited as a basis for broadening and deepening the alliance's roles and missions. It was also pointed out that speaking of "values" may be a politically correct, less threatening way to address mutual Japan-U.S. concerns over China.
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/v05n03_pdf[1].pdf
Related to my remarks on Japanese hard vs. soft power, many participants argued that Japan has "international political capital" to spend, particularly by weighing in on global security issues. http://www.globescan.com/news_archives/bbcpoll06-3.html
In a noted departure from the so-called "reactionary" security policies of the past (where Japan was primarily seen to be responding to American gaiatsu), at this meeting many Japanese delegates expressed an active desire on the part of Japan to be more involved, for example, in nuclear negotiations with Iran.
http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=3742555
This elicited American comments implying "be careful what you wish for" and speculation about what greater international security role Japan desires. Some Japanese delegates suggested that the U.S. is not being supportive enough of Japan's UNSC bid (http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/reform/index.html). Others suggested Japan act as a "thought leader" for the region (seemingly in reference to Foreign Minister Aso's recent speech).
In discussions of Japanese international contribution and regional leadership, of course the Yasukuni issue came up, (see related postings). The concern expressed by many Japanese delegates was that the Yasukuni controversy is giving China the "moral high ground" to expand its influence in Southeast Asia.
http://www.japanfocus.org/article.asp?id=414
American participants often cited the importance of paying more attention to India. It is no coincidence that the Bush administration is upgrading diplomatic efforts with India with a focus on economic and nuclear cooperation.
http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_progj/task,view/id,526/
Finally, what I consider the major open questions of the conference: looking forward, what are Japan's comfortable limits on international security missions (humanitarian operations, UN-sanctioned interventions, collective defense, rear area support for coalitions of the willing?) and to what extent is the U.S. comfortable with Japan engaging in more independent foreign/security policies (concerning normalization with the DPRK, Iran nuclear and energy negotiations, China policy, etc.)? In other words, what are reasonable expectations for future U.S.-Japan security cooperation and where might Japanese and American national interests diverge?
The Bush-Koizumi partnership appears rock solid and resolved to push the alliance forward (and sweep bad news under the carpet). So it may be until the next administrations take over in Washington and Tokyo that we are able to answer these questions.
One provocative suggestion made at the conference was for a Japan-U.S. FTA. At issue of course would be Japanese market liberalization, especially concerning agricultural protection.
http://www.cfr.org/publication/8058/on_japan.html?breadcrumb=default
Basing issues were discussed within the context of the recent 2+2 agreement and local opposition to force realignment plans. Japanese domestic support for U.S. military bases was called the "weakest link" in the Japan-U.S. alliance, requiring greater attention from both sides.
http://www.eastwestcenter.org/res-pr-detail.asp?resproj_ID=159
With the recent trend of upgrading the alliance, the old question of "will Japan become the UK of Asia?" resurfaced. Opinions differed, but it was clear that dialogue about the alliance was much more "values based" than years past. Shared values were cited as a basis for broadening and deepening the alliance's roles and missions. It was also pointed out that speaking of "values" may be a politically correct, less threatening way to address mutual Japan-U.S. concerns over China.
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/v05n03_pdf[1].pdf
Related to my remarks on Japanese hard vs. soft power, many participants argued that Japan has "international political capital" to spend, particularly by weighing in on global security issues. http://www.globescan.com/news_archives/bbcpoll06-3.html
In a noted departure from the so-called "reactionary" security policies of the past (where Japan was primarily seen to be responding to American gaiatsu), at this meeting many Japanese delegates expressed an active desire on the part of Japan to be more involved, for example, in nuclear negotiations with Iran.
http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=3742555
This elicited American comments implying "be careful what you wish for" and speculation about what greater international security role Japan desires. Some Japanese delegates suggested that the U.S. is not being supportive enough of Japan's UNSC bid (http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/reform/index.html). Others suggested Japan act as a "thought leader" for the region (seemingly in reference to Foreign Minister Aso's recent speech).
In discussions of Japanese international contribution and regional leadership, of course the Yasukuni issue came up, (see related postings). The concern expressed by many Japanese delegates was that the Yasukuni controversy is giving China the "moral high ground" to expand its influence in Southeast Asia.
http://www.japanfocus.org/article.asp?id=414
American participants often cited the importance of paying more attention to India. It is no coincidence that the Bush administration is upgrading diplomatic efforts with India with a focus on economic and nuclear cooperation.
http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_progj/task,view/id,526/
Finally, what I consider the major open questions of the conference: looking forward, what are Japan's comfortable limits on international security missions (humanitarian operations, UN-sanctioned interventions, collective defense, rear area support for coalitions of the willing?) and to what extent is the U.S. comfortable with Japan engaging in more independent foreign/security policies (concerning normalization with the DPRK, Iran nuclear and energy negotiations, China policy, etc.)? In other words, what are reasonable expectations for future U.S.-Japan security cooperation and where might Japanese and American national interests diverge?
The Bush-Koizumi partnership appears rock solid and resolved to push the alliance forward (and sweep bad news under the carpet). So it may be until the next administrations take over in Washington and Tokyo that we are able to answer these questions.
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