Japanese elections and foreign policy

I was recently asked whether Prime Minister Koizumi won the landslide victory for his Liberal Democratic Party on September 11 because of his positions on postal reform or foreign policy. I was also asked whether this electoral victory will lead to a more assertive Japanese approach in its relations with China.

On Q1: I don’t think Japanese voters were particularly sold on Koizumi-san’s postal reform or his foreign policy. I think they voted for his boldness and image. Koizumi masterfully avoided talking about specifics or a broad range of issues before the election; instead, he took unprecedented bold political action to convey to voters his strength and determination. By purging anti-postal reform LDP members and running assassins against them, and calling an early election where Koizumi bet not just his own political career but the future of the entire LDP, Koizumi seized the initiative, the headlines, and most importantly, the voter’s confidence for reelection.

On Q2: my sense is Koizumi is not anti-China, but that he believes Japan should stand up to China when necessary for the national interest (and when it’s politically convenient for the prime minister of course). Koizumi’s victory does make him less reliant on the nationalist vote. But I don’t think Koizumi will give ground (Re: Yasukuni, island disputes or other such issues) without getting something in return. So my tentative answer to the question is I don’t think Koizumi will be increasingly antagonistic of China after the election, but I don’t see him unilaterally extending any olive branches either.

In addition, I would offer several key implications of this election:

1. The outcome bodes well for U.S.-Japan relations. I think we can expect gradually increasing cooperation in the security alliance.

2. The outcome is probably good news for economic reform, although the pace will likely remain slow. While I said the election results probably shouldn’t be interpreted as blanket approval of postal privatization, I think there is strong public sentiment against complacency on economic reform.

3. The Democratic Party of Japan, recently thought to be bringing Japan into a stable 2-party system, is now a basket case. Students of Japanese politics will be intensely watching the reorganization of the DPJ to see how it might mount a comeback or continue to fall.

4. I’m a little concerned about backsliding on the part of the LDP if and when Koizumi steps down once his LDP president clock runs out in September 2006. Of course, it's not impossible that the LDP constitution might be revised to allow him to stay on…but people I've spoken with in the Koizumi administration (off the record) seem pretty confident Koizumi will stay just one more year, will groom a successor in his cabinet, and will bring the JSDF home from Iraq.

5. Which leads me to my final point: the increasing likelihood of a government push to revise the Japanese Constitution. The LDP-Komeito coalition now has the super-majority necessary in the Diet. But although amending the Constitution appears more likely now than it ever has, it is by no means a cakewalk. There are many points on which the Constitution may be revised, and support on these various points is fractionalized and contentious. Most relevant for Japan’s international relations – revision of Article 9 – would be politically sensitive for Komeito (whose votes are necessary for the supermajority), and strongly contested in the Japanese public, to say nothing of objections from Japan’s neighbors. The process for constitutional revision is also difficult, logistically because it’s never been done before, and in terms of public opinion, because a referendum would be necessary. This isn’t to say that Koizumi can’t pull it off. The LDP will likely test the waters by publishing a revision suggestion once the postal reform bill passes. Needless to say, the next year will be a very interesting time for Japanese politics.

Japanese textbooks

Japan's rekishi mondai (history problem) with Asian neighbors significantly involves the treatment of Japanese imperialism and war in government approved textbooks. Chinese, Koreans and others often object Japanese textbooks at best white-wash Japan's imperial past, and at worst distort and manipulate history for political purposes.

I have often been surprised by the apparent lack of historical knowledge among Japanese students (many Americans' lack of historical knowledge frankly scares me, but that's another discussion…) Suffice it to say, history education is a real problem in Japan. But many of the international charges against Japanese textbooks are made based on hearsay, not on actual readings of Japanese textbooks.

This is where Japan Echo comes in. A website just launched (http://www.je-kaleidoscope.jp/) provides a collection of translations (in English, Chinese and Korean) of Japanese middle school history textbooks approved by the Ministry of Education. Making this material available online is important work for closing perception gaps on the history issue and facilitating good-faith efforts to improve history education in our countries.

The information will not have an impact, however, unless word gets out about the project. I am presently conducting research in Korea and regularly read the Chosunilbo, Hankookilbo/Korea Times, JoongAng Daily, Korea Herald and Hankyoreh. I haven’t seen any coverage in these papers about the Japan Echo translations, so I have written suggesting they mention the website in any upcoming articles about the textbook issue.

I have read Korean news reports that the Fusosha textbook (probably the most revisionist) has been adopted by less than half a percent of Japanese schools. Korean sources have noted this is thanks in part to the efforts of Japanese civil groups advocating a boycott of the text. And more than one editorial has suggested an alliance of Japanese and Korean civil society groups to discourage the use of revisionist textbooks.

It is worth noting that the recently published Korea-China-Japan joint history textbook has received favorable press and sales here in Korea. I have not yet read this volume, but have heard it represents a start in building common understandings of history, despite current limitations of the project (I am told that what the three sides couldn't agree on was basically thrown out, leaving serious gaps in historical coverage).

Finally, I have also noticed that Korea is engaging in some healthy self-criticism on the textbook issue – the Korean Ministry of Education is soliciting suggestions on their website about how to improve Korean history textbooks.