Yasukuni Shrine

On October 17th, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi made his annual visit to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine. The public and diplomatic reactions from the PRC and ROK were strong as with past visits. I was in Taipei at the time, and observed a different sentiment in Taiwan. Numerous people I spoke with were by no means supportive of Koizumi’s visits, but rather than being outraged, they felt at a loss about why the Prime Minister makes these visits at the expense of Japan’s relations with Asian neighbors. I was asked to provide explanation of the motivations behind the visits, which I summarize in five points below.

1. Perhaps Koizumi’s greatest political asset is his tough, uncompromising image. This is what helped him convincingly win the September election. Before assuming the Prime Ministership, Koizumi-san promised he would visit Yasukuni every year. This pledge has been widely publicized and he wants to be seen as making good on his promise. I believe that Koizumi’s personality and personal pledge are a piece of the puzzle, but a piece we might see resolved once he steps down as Prime Minister.

2. A reasonably cynical view about Koizumi’s Yasukuni visits is that he goes for domestic political gain. But this explanation is loosing traction. At first, Koizumi lacked strong factional support as an LDP ‘maverick’ and may have needed Yasukuni to gain conservative backing. But Koizumi’s political situation is strong today, and Yasukuni is becoming more unpopular in Japanese domestic politics.

3. A more difficult matter is the role of Yasukuni Shrine in Japanese society. I have met Japanese who deeply believe that the souls of their lost ancestors reside at Yasukuni. Koizumi and others may genuinely feel it is their duty to show respect to those who died in the service of their country. This seems to merit understanding and respect from outsiders. The problem is Yasukuni is a polluted national memorial. It is a Shinto shrine with historical links to Japanese militarism. It is administered by people with a deeply revisionist view of Japanese imperialism. Most problematically, Yasukuni priests secretly decided to enshrine the spirits of war criminals there decades after the war. So by going to Yasukuni, it can appear that Koizumi is violating the postwar separation of church and state, endorsing revisionist history, and worshiping war criminals. And yet, since no other major national memorial to Japan’s war dead exists, Koizumi may be going primarily to pay his respects and pray for peace. What needs to be addressed here is the role of Yasukuni in Japanese society. For years I have suggested building a secular memorial to those fallen Japanese (both military and civilian) who sacrificed and suffered for their country. The new memorial need not focus on responsibility, blame or apology, but should be a monument unquestionably devoted to peace, where Japanese officials and the public can go to pay their respects. This matter however, is not for Chinese, Koreans, Southeast Asians or Americans to decide, it is for the Japanese people to resolve.

4. Which brings me to what I think is perhaps the strongest explanation for Koizumi’s continued visits: that he will not change his position vis-à-vis Yasukuni to please China. His personal beliefs, his international calculus, and Japanese public opinion demand that Koizumi avoid concessions to Beijing on Yasukuni. There are many reasons for this dynamic, one being concerns over China’s rise and another being Japanese apology fatigue. The dilemma here is that the more China, Korea and others demand that Koizumi not visit Yasukuni, the more locked in he is to going. This is unfortunate because the damage to bilateral relations is real and the negative perceptions of Japan among people in neighboring countries are persisting and even deepening. This tragic interaction of domestic and international politics could be ameliorated with visible action by Japanese and/or regional leaders to put history in the past.

5. The reason this may not happen could be more serious than a coordination problem, lingering historical antagonisms or face-saving politics. It may be that the Chinese and other national leaderships want to retain anti-Japanese sentiment to use for their own political benefit. More to the point of the discussion here, it may be that Koizumi-san actually wants to antagonize Japan’s neighbors, especially China. Why? Because while the threat from North Korea may be enough to bolster support for missile defense and a more integrated U.S.-Japan security alliance, it is not enough to revolutionize Japan’s defense posture, amend Article 9 of the Constitution or allow Tokyo to take a more assertive international role. These changes, should they be deemed strategically necessary by Japan’s leadership, would likely require heightened public concern for China, especially given the trajectory of Japanese economic interdependence with the PRC. Violent, seemingly unreasonable, anti-Japanese protests in China coupled with stern diplomatic warnings from Beijing feed such public concern. So it may be that Yasukuni is simply a pawn in a strategy of Japanese elites to redefine Japan’s role on the global stage. I personally find this pessimistic view somewhat alarmist. I think good relations with Asian neighbors are helpful, even necessary, for Japan’s international goals and continued prosperity. I think most Japanese would agree. So domestic debate in Japan may increasingly turn to the question: "are prime ministerial visits to Yasukuni in the national interest?"