Japanese elections and foreign policy

I was recently asked whether Prime Minister Koizumi won the landslide victory for his Liberal Democratic Party on September 11 because of his positions on postal reform or foreign policy. I was also asked whether this electoral victory will lead to a more assertive Japanese approach in its relations with China.

On Q1: I don’t think Japanese voters were particularly sold on Koizumi-san’s postal reform or his foreign policy. I think they voted for his boldness and image. Koizumi masterfully avoided talking about specifics or a broad range of issues before the election; instead, he took unprecedented bold political action to convey to voters his strength and determination. By purging anti-postal reform LDP members and running assassins against them, and calling an early election where Koizumi bet not just his own political career but the future of the entire LDP, Koizumi seized the initiative, the headlines, and most importantly, the voter’s confidence for reelection.

On Q2: my sense is Koizumi is not anti-China, but that he believes Japan should stand up to China when necessary for the national interest (and when it’s politically convenient for the prime minister of course). Koizumi’s victory does make him less reliant on the nationalist vote. But I don’t think Koizumi will give ground (Re: Yasukuni, island disputes or other such issues) without getting something in return. So my tentative answer to the question is I don’t think Koizumi will be increasingly antagonistic of China after the election, but I don’t see him unilaterally extending any olive branches either.

In addition, I would offer several key implications of this election:

1. The outcome bodes well for U.S.-Japan relations. I think we can expect gradually increasing cooperation in the security alliance.

2. The outcome is probably good news for economic reform, although the pace will likely remain slow. While I said the election results probably shouldn’t be interpreted as blanket approval of postal privatization, I think there is strong public sentiment against complacency on economic reform.

3. The Democratic Party of Japan, recently thought to be bringing Japan into a stable 2-party system, is now a basket case. Students of Japanese politics will be intensely watching the reorganization of the DPJ to see how it might mount a comeback or continue to fall.

4. I’m a little concerned about backsliding on the part of the LDP if and when Koizumi steps down once his LDP president clock runs out in September 2006. Of course, it's not impossible that the LDP constitution might be revised to allow him to stay on…but people I've spoken with in the Koizumi administration (off the record) seem pretty confident Koizumi will stay just one more year, will groom a successor in his cabinet, and will bring the JSDF home from Iraq.

5. Which leads me to my final point: the increasing likelihood of a government push to revise the Japanese Constitution. The LDP-Komeito coalition now has the super-majority necessary in the Diet. But although amending the Constitution appears more likely now than it ever has, it is by no means a cakewalk. There are many points on which the Constitution may be revised, and support on these various points is fractionalized and contentious. Most relevant for Japan’s international relations – revision of Article 9 – would be politically sensitive for Komeito (whose votes are necessary for the supermajority), and strongly contested in the Japanese public, to say nothing of objections from Japan’s neighbors. The process for constitutional revision is also difficult, logistically because it’s never been done before, and in terms of public opinion, because a referendum would be necessary. This isn’t to say that Koizumi can’t pull it off. The LDP will likely test the waters by publishing a revision suggestion once the postal reform bill passes. Needless to say, the next year will be a very interesting time for Japanese politics.