How might national leaders be given (or effectively come to perceive) necessary incentives for putting the history issue in the past?
Before I attempt a tentative answer to this question, let me first say what “putting history in the past” might mean. The truth is historical antagonisms will never go away completely; history will constantly be reinterpreted to fit the purposes of those doing the interpreting. So what I mean by “putting history in the past” is getting (back) to a point where the politics of historical memory do not prevent leaders from meeting, do not inspire a spiral of nationalistic statements and actions by leaders, and do not weigh heavily on expectations for future relations (manifested in foreign direct investment, military contingency planning, etc.)
This being said, what changed incentives are necessary for governments to contain (or even reduce) the negative effects of historical antagonisms? If we assume leaders want to preserve their position, the problem is that “using” historical antagonisms presently appears helpful for maintaining power. But is this necessarily the case? Not if leaders’ incentives were to change so that healing international historical wounds actually helped them domestically. How might such change of incentives come about, to the benefit of more cooperative international relations in Northeast Asia?
The answer has to do with economics and accountability. Second only to providing for physical security and maintaining a domestic monopoly on its enforcement, governments stay in power by advancing the economic livelihood of their people. While it’s true that governments can “use” historical issues to aid their own legitimacy, divert people’s attention away from domestic problems by rallying them around the flag, and be deployed as a stick against other government’s policies, such tactics are generally bad for business. If the historical issues in Northeast Asia get much worse, they will visibly weigh on people’s prosperity. Are the publics of Japan, China and South Korea sophisticated enough to understand this? Of course. Are they willing to take their leaders to task for failing to act in their greater economic interests? I think yes.
For leaders’ incentives to change for putting history in the past, they need to be convinced of the economic costs of history politics, and publics need to hold their governments accountable for these costs.
Thursday, December 29, 2005
Saturday, October 22, 2005
Yasukuni Shrine
On October 17th, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi made his annual visit to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine. The public and diplomatic reactions from the PRC and ROK were strong as with past visits. I was in Taipei at the time, and observed a different sentiment in Taiwan. Numerous people I spoke with were by no means supportive of Koizumi’s visits, but rather than being outraged, they felt at a loss about why the Prime Minister makes these visits at the expense of Japan’s relations with Asian neighbors. I was asked to provide explanation of the motivations behind the visits, which I summarize in five points below.
1. Perhaps Koizumi’s greatest political asset is his tough, uncompromising image. This is what helped him convincingly win the September election. Before assuming the Prime Ministership, Koizumi-san promised he would visit Yasukuni every year. This pledge has been widely publicized and he wants to be seen as making good on his promise. I believe that Koizumi’s personality and personal pledge are a piece of the puzzle, but a piece we might see resolved once he steps down as Prime Minister.
2. A reasonably cynical view about Koizumi’s Yasukuni visits is that he goes for domestic political gain. But this explanation is loosing traction. At first, Koizumi lacked strong factional support as an LDP ‘maverick’ and may have needed Yasukuni to gain conservative backing. But Koizumi’s political situation is strong today, and Yasukuni is becoming more unpopular in Japanese domestic politics.
3. A more difficult matter is the role of Yasukuni Shrine in Japanese society. I have met Japanese who deeply believe that the souls of their lost ancestors reside at Yasukuni. Koizumi and others may genuinely feel it is their duty to show respect to those who died in the service of their country. This seems to merit understanding and respect from outsiders. The problem is Yasukuni is a polluted national memorial. It is a Shinto shrine with historical links to Japanese militarism. It is administered by people with a deeply revisionist view of Japanese imperialism. Most problematically, Yasukuni priests secretly decided to enshrine the spirits of war criminals there decades after the war. So by going to Yasukuni, it can appear that Koizumi is violating the postwar separation of church and state, endorsing revisionist history, and worshiping war criminals. And yet, since no other major national memorial to Japan’s war dead exists, Koizumi may be going primarily to pay his respects and pray for peace. What needs to be addressed here is the role of Yasukuni in Japanese society. For years I have suggested building a secular memorial to those fallen Japanese (both military and civilian) who sacrificed and suffered for their country. The new memorial need not focus on responsibility, blame or apology, but should be a monument unquestionably devoted to peace, where Japanese officials and the public can go to pay their respects. This matter however, is not for Chinese, Koreans, Southeast Asians or Americans to decide, it is for the Japanese people to resolve.
4. Which brings me to what I think is perhaps the strongest explanation for Koizumi’s continued visits: that he will not change his position vis-à-vis Yasukuni to please China. His personal beliefs, his international calculus, and Japanese public opinion demand that Koizumi avoid concessions to Beijing on Yasukuni. There are many reasons for this dynamic, one being concerns over China’s rise and another being Japanese apology fatigue. The dilemma here is that the more China, Korea and others demand that Koizumi not visit Yasukuni, the more locked in he is to going. This is unfortunate because the damage to bilateral relations is real and the negative perceptions of Japan among people in neighboring countries are persisting and even deepening. This tragic interaction of domestic and international politics could be ameliorated with visible action by Japanese and/or regional leaders to put history in the past.
5. The reason this may not happen could be more serious than a coordination problem, lingering historical antagonisms or face-saving politics. It may be that the Chinese and other national leaderships want to retain anti-Japanese sentiment to use for their own political benefit. More to the point of the discussion here, it may be that Koizumi-san actually wants to antagonize Japan’s neighbors, especially China. Why? Because while the threat from North Korea may be enough to bolster support for missile defense and a more integrated U.S.-Japan security alliance, it is not enough to revolutionize Japan’s defense posture, amend Article 9 of the Constitution or allow Tokyo to take a more assertive international role. These changes, should they be deemed strategically necessary by Japan’s leadership, would likely require heightened public concern for China, especially given the trajectory of Japanese economic interdependence with the PRC. Violent, seemingly unreasonable, anti-Japanese protests in China coupled with stern diplomatic warnings from Beijing feed such public concern. So it may be that Yasukuni is simply a pawn in a strategy of Japanese elites to redefine Japan’s role on the global stage. I personally find this pessimistic view somewhat alarmist. I think good relations with Asian neighbors are helpful, even necessary, for Japan’s international goals and continued prosperity. I think most Japanese would agree. So domestic debate in Japan may increasingly turn to the question: "are prime ministerial visits to Yasukuni in the national interest?"
1. Perhaps Koizumi’s greatest political asset is his tough, uncompromising image. This is what helped him convincingly win the September election. Before assuming the Prime Ministership, Koizumi-san promised he would visit Yasukuni every year. This pledge has been widely publicized and he wants to be seen as making good on his promise. I believe that Koizumi’s personality and personal pledge are a piece of the puzzle, but a piece we might see resolved once he steps down as Prime Minister.
2. A reasonably cynical view about Koizumi’s Yasukuni visits is that he goes for domestic political gain. But this explanation is loosing traction. At first, Koizumi lacked strong factional support as an LDP ‘maverick’ and may have needed Yasukuni to gain conservative backing. But Koizumi’s political situation is strong today, and Yasukuni is becoming more unpopular in Japanese domestic politics.
3. A more difficult matter is the role of Yasukuni Shrine in Japanese society. I have met Japanese who deeply believe that the souls of their lost ancestors reside at Yasukuni. Koizumi and others may genuinely feel it is their duty to show respect to those who died in the service of their country. This seems to merit understanding and respect from outsiders. The problem is Yasukuni is a polluted national memorial. It is a Shinto shrine with historical links to Japanese militarism. It is administered by people with a deeply revisionist view of Japanese imperialism. Most problematically, Yasukuni priests secretly decided to enshrine the spirits of war criminals there decades after the war. So by going to Yasukuni, it can appear that Koizumi is violating the postwar separation of church and state, endorsing revisionist history, and worshiping war criminals. And yet, since no other major national memorial to Japan’s war dead exists, Koizumi may be going primarily to pay his respects and pray for peace. What needs to be addressed here is the role of Yasukuni in Japanese society. For years I have suggested building a secular memorial to those fallen Japanese (both military and civilian) who sacrificed and suffered for their country. The new memorial need not focus on responsibility, blame or apology, but should be a monument unquestionably devoted to peace, where Japanese officials and the public can go to pay their respects. This matter however, is not for Chinese, Koreans, Southeast Asians or Americans to decide, it is for the Japanese people to resolve.
4. Which brings me to what I think is perhaps the strongest explanation for Koizumi’s continued visits: that he will not change his position vis-à-vis Yasukuni to please China. His personal beliefs, his international calculus, and Japanese public opinion demand that Koizumi avoid concessions to Beijing on Yasukuni. There are many reasons for this dynamic, one being concerns over China’s rise and another being Japanese apology fatigue. The dilemma here is that the more China, Korea and others demand that Koizumi not visit Yasukuni, the more locked in he is to going. This is unfortunate because the damage to bilateral relations is real and the negative perceptions of Japan among people in neighboring countries are persisting and even deepening. This tragic interaction of domestic and international politics could be ameliorated with visible action by Japanese and/or regional leaders to put history in the past.
5. The reason this may not happen could be more serious than a coordination problem, lingering historical antagonisms or face-saving politics. It may be that the Chinese and other national leaderships want to retain anti-Japanese sentiment to use for their own political benefit. More to the point of the discussion here, it may be that Koizumi-san actually wants to antagonize Japan’s neighbors, especially China. Why? Because while the threat from North Korea may be enough to bolster support for missile defense and a more integrated U.S.-Japan security alliance, it is not enough to revolutionize Japan’s defense posture, amend Article 9 of the Constitution or allow Tokyo to take a more assertive international role. These changes, should they be deemed strategically necessary by Japan’s leadership, would likely require heightened public concern for China, especially given the trajectory of Japanese economic interdependence with the PRC. Violent, seemingly unreasonable, anti-Japanese protests in China coupled with stern diplomatic warnings from Beijing feed such public concern. So it may be that Yasukuni is simply a pawn in a strategy of Japanese elites to redefine Japan’s role on the global stage. I personally find this pessimistic view somewhat alarmist. I think good relations with Asian neighbors are helpful, even necessary, for Japan’s international goals and continued prosperity. I think most Japanese would agree. So domestic debate in Japan may increasingly turn to the question: "are prime ministerial visits to Yasukuni in the national interest?"
Saturday, September 17, 2005
Japanese elections and foreign policy
I was recently asked whether Prime Minister Koizumi won the landslide victory for his Liberal Democratic Party on September 11 because of his positions on postal reform or foreign policy. I was also asked whether this electoral victory will lead to a more assertive Japanese approach in its relations with China.
On Q1: I don’t think Japanese voters were particularly sold on Koizumi-san’s postal reform or his foreign policy. I think they voted for his boldness and image. Koizumi masterfully avoided talking about specifics or a broad range of issues before the election; instead, he took unprecedented bold political action to convey to voters his strength and determination. By purging anti-postal reform LDP members and running assassins against them, and calling an early election where Koizumi bet not just his own political career but the future of the entire LDP, Koizumi seized the initiative, the headlines, and most importantly, the voter’s confidence for reelection.
On Q2: my sense is Koizumi is not anti-China, but that he believes Japan should stand up to China when necessary for the national interest (and when it’s politically convenient for the prime minister of course). Koizumi’s victory does make him less reliant on the nationalist vote. But I don’t think Koizumi will give ground (Re: Yasukuni, island disputes or other such issues) without getting something in return. So my tentative answer to the question is I don’t think Koizumi will be increasingly antagonistic of China after the election, but I don’t see him unilaterally extending any olive branches either.
In addition, I would offer several key implications of this election:
1. The outcome bodes well for U.S.-Japan relations. I think we can expect gradually increasing cooperation in the security alliance.
2. The outcome is probably good news for economic reform, although the pace will likely remain slow. While I said the election results probably shouldn’t be interpreted as blanket approval of postal privatization, I think there is strong public sentiment against complacency on economic reform.
3. The Democratic Party of Japan, recently thought to be bringing Japan into a stable 2-party system, is now a basket case. Students of Japanese politics will be intensely watching the reorganization of the DPJ to see how it might mount a comeback or continue to fall.
4. I’m a little concerned about backsliding on the part of the LDP if and when Koizumi steps down once his LDP president clock runs out in September 2006. Of course, it's not impossible that the LDP constitution might be revised to allow him to stay on…but people I've spoken with in the Koizumi administration (off the record) seem pretty confident Koizumi will stay just one more year, will groom a successor in his cabinet, and will bring the JSDF home from Iraq.
5. Which leads me to my final point: the increasing likelihood of a government push to revise the Japanese Constitution. The LDP-Komeito coalition now has the super-majority necessary in the Diet. But although amending the Constitution appears more likely now than it ever has, it is by no means a cakewalk. There are many points on which the Constitution may be revised, and support on these various points is fractionalized and contentious. Most relevant for Japan’s international relations – revision of Article 9 – would be politically sensitive for Komeito (whose votes are necessary for the supermajority), and strongly contested in the Japanese public, to say nothing of objections from Japan’s neighbors. The process for constitutional revision is also difficult, logistically because it’s never been done before, and in terms of public opinion, because a referendum would be necessary. This isn’t to say that Koizumi can’t pull it off. The LDP will likely test the waters by publishing a revision suggestion once the postal reform bill passes. Needless to say, the next year will be a very interesting time for Japanese politics.
On Q1: I don’t think Japanese voters were particularly sold on Koizumi-san’s postal reform or his foreign policy. I think they voted for his boldness and image. Koizumi masterfully avoided talking about specifics or a broad range of issues before the election; instead, he took unprecedented bold political action to convey to voters his strength and determination. By purging anti-postal reform LDP members and running assassins against them, and calling an early election where Koizumi bet not just his own political career but the future of the entire LDP, Koizumi seized the initiative, the headlines, and most importantly, the voter’s confidence for reelection.
On Q2: my sense is Koizumi is not anti-China, but that he believes Japan should stand up to China when necessary for the national interest (and when it’s politically convenient for the prime minister of course). Koizumi’s victory does make him less reliant on the nationalist vote. But I don’t think Koizumi will give ground (Re: Yasukuni, island disputes or other such issues) without getting something in return. So my tentative answer to the question is I don’t think Koizumi will be increasingly antagonistic of China after the election, but I don’t see him unilaterally extending any olive branches either.
In addition, I would offer several key implications of this election:
1. The outcome bodes well for U.S.-Japan relations. I think we can expect gradually increasing cooperation in the security alliance.
2. The outcome is probably good news for economic reform, although the pace will likely remain slow. While I said the election results probably shouldn’t be interpreted as blanket approval of postal privatization, I think there is strong public sentiment against complacency on economic reform.
3. The Democratic Party of Japan, recently thought to be bringing Japan into a stable 2-party system, is now a basket case. Students of Japanese politics will be intensely watching the reorganization of the DPJ to see how it might mount a comeback or continue to fall.
4. I’m a little concerned about backsliding on the part of the LDP if and when Koizumi steps down once his LDP president clock runs out in September 2006. Of course, it's not impossible that the LDP constitution might be revised to allow him to stay on…but people I've spoken with in the Koizumi administration (off the record) seem pretty confident Koizumi will stay just one more year, will groom a successor in his cabinet, and will bring the JSDF home from Iraq.
5. Which leads me to my final point: the increasing likelihood of a government push to revise the Japanese Constitution. The LDP-Komeito coalition now has the super-majority necessary in the Diet. But although amending the Constitution appears more likely now than it ever has, it is by no means a cakewalk. There are many points on which the Constitution may be revised, and support on these various points is fractionalized and contentious. Most relevant for Japan’s international relations – revision of Article 9 – would be politically sensitive for Komeito (whose votes are necessary for the supermajority), and strongly contested in the Japanese public, to say nothing of objections from Japan’s neighbors. The process for constitutional revision is also difficult, logistically because it’s never been done before, and in terms of public opinion, because a referendum would be necessary. This isn’t to say that Koizumi can’t pull it off. The LDP will likely test the waters by publishing a revision suggestion once the postal reform bill passes. Needless to say, the next year will be a very interesting time for Japanese politics.
Thursday, September 08, 2005
Japanese textbooks
Japan's rekishi mondai (history problem) with Asian neighbors significantly involves the treatment of Japanese imperialism and war in government approved textbooks. Chinese, Koreans and others often object Japanese textbooks at best white-wash Japan's imperial past, and at worst distort and manipulate history for political purposes.
I have often been surprised by the apparent lack of historical knowledge among Japanese students (many Americans' lack of historical knowledge frankly scares me, but that's another discussion…) Suffice it to say, history education is a real problem in Japan. But many of the international charges against Japanese textbooks are made based on hearsay, not on actual readings of Japanese textbooks.
This is where Japan Echo comes in. A website just launched (http://www.je-kaleidoscope.jp/) provides a collection of translations (in English, Chinese and Korean) of Japanese middle school history textbooks approved by the Ministry of Education. Making this material available online is important work for closing perception gaps on the history issue and facilitating good-faith efforts to improve history education in our countries.
The information will not have an impact, however, unless word gets out about the project. I am presently conducting research in Korea and regularly read the Chosunilbo, Hankookilbo/Korea Times, JoongAng Daily, Korea Herald and Hankyoreh. I haven’t seen any coverage in these papers about the Japan Echo translations, so I have written suggesting they mention the website in any upcoming articles about the textbook issue.
I have read Korean news reports that the Fusosha textbook (probably the most revisionist) has been adopted by less than half a percent of Japanese schools. Korean sources have noted this is thanks in part to the efforts of Japanese civil groups advocating a boycott of the text. And more than one editorial has suggested an alliance of Japanese and Korean civil society groups to discourage the use of revisionist textbooks.
It is worth noting that the recently published Korea-China-Japan joint history textbook has received favorable press and sales here in Korea. I have not yet read this volume, but have heard it represents a start in building common understandings of history, despite current limitations of the project (I am told that what the three sides couldn't agree on was basically thrown out, leaving serious gaps in historical coverage).
Finally, I have also noticed that Korea is engaging in some healthy self-criticism on the textbook issue – the Korean Ministry of Education is soliciting suggestions on their website about how to improve Korean history textbooks.
I have often been surprised by the apparent lack of historical knowledge among Japanese students (many Americans' lack of historical knowledge frankly scares me, but that's another discussion…) Suffice it to say, history education is a real problem in Japan. But many of the international charges against Japanese textbooks are made based on hearsay, not on actual readings of Japanese textbooks.
This is where Japan Echo comes in. A website just launched (http://www.je-kaleidoscope.jp/) provides a collection of translations (in English, Chinese and Korean) of Japanese middle school history textbooks approved by the Ministry of Education. Making this material available online is important work for closing perception gaps on the history issue and facilitating good-faith efforts to improve history education in our countries.
The information will not have an impact, however, unless word gets out about the project. I am presently conducting research in Korea and regularly read the Chosunilbo, Hankookilbo/Korea Times, JoongAng Daily, Korea Herald and Hankyoreh. I haven’t seen any coverage in these papers about the Japan Echo translations, so I have written suggesting they mention the website in any upcoming articles about the textbook issue.
I have read Korean news reports that the Fusosha textbook (probably the most revisionist) has been adopted by less than half a percent of Japanese schools. Korean sources have noted this is thanks in part to the efforts of Japanese civil groups advocating a boycott of the text. And more than one editorial has suggested an alliance of Japanese and Korean civil society groups to discourage the use of revisionist textbooks.
It is worth noting that the recently published Korea-China-Japan joint history textbook has received favorable press and sales here in Korea. I have not yet read this volume, but have heard it represents a start in building common understandings of history, despite current limitations of the project (I am told that what the three sides couldn't agree on was basically thrown out, leaving serious gaps in historical coverage).
Finally, I have also noticed that Korea is engaging in some healthy self-criticism on the textbook issue – the Korean Ministry of Education is soliciting suggestions on their website about how to improve Korean history textbooks.
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