Middle Power National Identity? South Korea and Vietnam in U.S.-China Geopolitics

New SSCI journal article published today:

Leif-Eric Easley, "Middle Power National Identity?: South Korea and Vietnam in U.S.-China Geopolitics," Pacific Focus, Vol. 27, No. 3, December 2012, pp. 421-442.

The middle powers literature often conflates role identity (national self-conception) of middle power states with role performance (foreign policies), while neglecting East Asia as a region of hypothesis generation and testing. This article contributes to the middle powers literature by comparing the post-Cold War national identities and foreign policies of South Korea and Vietnam. The article examines how identity trajectories relate to change in South Korea and Vietnam's geopolitical positioning between the United States and China, and assesses the prospects for middle power cooperation in East Asia.

Myanmar’s Reforms and Lessons for North Korea

Does Myanmar provide a viable model for North Korea to follow? A new Asan Issue Brief considers the recent political changes in Myanmar and compares its domestic political structures and foreign relations with North Korea's. While the Burmese case may not represent a "model" for North Korea, recent developments in Myanmar offer useful lessons for both Pyongyang and other governments reworking their policies toward North Korea. Moreover, the two cases exhibit notable interaction such that Naypyidaw's successes and failures in implementing reforms will likely have demonstration effects for Pyongyang.

Mechanics of Trust between China and the U.S.

The International Herald Tribune - New York Times published comments I made regarding the "Mechanics of Trust" between China and the U.S.

Few disagree that despite their low level of mutual trust, the U.S. and China should strive for cooperation on shared interests.  Governments generally do not pursue cooperation against national interests, and given all at stake economically and geopolitically, Washington and Beijing work to avoid outright conflict in areas of disagreement.  However, Yan Xuetong (“The Problem of ‘Mutual Trust,’” November 15) unfairly dismisses the importance of trust by treating it as a binary concept, as if two countries either have trust or not.  Better to consider trust as a continuous variable that can spiral up, yielding greater cooperation and even more trust; or spiral down, yielding less cooperation and even less trust.  My research suggests that positive spirals are driven by shared political values and negative spirals by conflicting values.  U.S.-China mutual trust declined after 1989 because of conflicting values over human rights; trust improved after 2001 because both sides valued a stable, free trade order that was threatened by ideological extremists.  The next chapter of U.S.-China relations will be written in a time of improving or deteriorating trust, depending on whether leaders in Washington and Beijing hold increasingly shared or conflicting beliefs about good governance.

Leif-Eric Easley

Seoul

The writer is a professor of international politics at Ewha University and a research fellow at the Asan Institute.

U.S. Leadership in Asia

A book chapter I co-authored with Professor Kang was recently published:

David Kang and Leif-Eric Easley, “The Role of the United States in the International Relations of East Asia: Still a Leader?” in Rudiger Frank and John Swenson-Wright, eds., Korea and East Asia: The Stony Road to Collective Security, Brill, 2012.

Video: NEA Security Architecture

Asan Plenum Panel on Northeast Asian Security Architecture

If the link below does not work on your machine, you can go to http://www.asanplenum.org/multimedia/videoArchive.asp, click on "Friday, April 27" and then click on "Session 7: Northeast Asian Security Architecture."  My colleagues' comments are most worthwhile; my talk starts at 37:35 and I answer questions at 55:08 and 67:10.

China's North Korea policy

Comments I made regarding China's North Korea policy were published today in PacNet by the Pacific Forum-Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

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In PacNet #32, Ralph A. Cossa and Brad Glosserman make a detailed case for how China's current approach toward North Korea actually contradicts many Chinese national interests.  Their argument can be supplemented by four additional concerns for China and its now indispensable role in international politics.

Cossa and Glosserman argue that Beijing's policies on North Korea undermine the UN Security Council.  Those same policies undermine the nuclear non-proliferation regime. China's shielding and aiding of North Korea has negative interaction effects concerning Iran and the Middle East, Pakistan-India, the monitoring role of the IAEA, and the inclusiveness of important enforcement efforts such as PSI.

Cossa and Glosserman point out that North Korean provocations strengthen U.S. alliance cooperation and relevance in the region.  In addition, North Korea is motivating specific military capabilities over which analysts in Beijing express concern: South Korean missiles with longer ranges and better accuracy, Japanese reconnaissance satellites, and U.S. missile defenses.

Thirdly, North Korea often reneges on agreements and resolutely takes more from China than it gives.  Thus, business with Pyongyang is high risk for Chinese companies and a financial burden on Beijing.  So while some observers accuse China of "economic imperialism," its policies toward North Korea may actually incur greater costs than the financial benefits involved.

Finally, in addition to damaging China's image in South Korea and Japan and its international reputation as an emerging "responsible stakeholder," China's policies on North Korea are setting a bad precedent for relations with regional neighbors associated with ethnic minority groups inside China. The way that Beijing deals with North Korean refugees and related rights groups does not live up to international norms or China’s own principles.  Instead, those policies are increasing fear, resentment and cross-border organization among ethnic Koreans.  Given the number of ethnic minority groups in China, and their complicated relationships with neighboring countries, this is not a good formula for social stability.

China has accomplished so much in recent decades, economically, diplomatically, and in terms of improving the quality of life of the Chinese people.  These accomplishments have brought China ever closer to South Korea, Japan, and the U.S.  China's national interests -- as well as international support for China's growing global role -- would be better served if Beijing worked closer with its forward-looking partners rather than with its anachronistic Cold War ally.

Asia's Security Architecture

The Economist published a piece today on Northeast Asian security architecture.  The beginning and end of the article references a presentation I gave on "The North Korea Nuclear Issue and Lack of Trust for Regional Security Architecture" at the 2012 Asan Plenum in Seoul.

South Korean Views of North Korea and the U.S.

Today the USC Korean Studies Institute published an interview I did regarding South Korean public opinion.

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A recent survey suggests that 70 percent of South Koreans would root for North Korea in a soccer match against the United States. What does this say about South Korean public opinion, even as Seoul and Washington cooperate in dealing with Pyongyang?

I always find the hypothetical soccer match question interesting, especially after experiencing the 2002 World Cup in Korea. But I think the question is a poor proxy for measuring trends relevant to foreign policy. Rooting for the North Korean soccer team is a near costless way for South Koreans to express ethnic nationalism. Korea has long been a painfully divided nation, so emotions are involved when South Koreans watch North Korean soccer, and this real-life drama sells well in the media. What is more, one might root for the North Korean footballers and sympathize with the North Korean people, but detest the regime in Pyongyang. One might also have an affinity for the U.S. but care little about the American soccer team. So I don’t think South Korean support of North Korean footballers says much about political or economic willingness to engage the North, the desire for unification, or the level of support for Pyongyang vs. Washington.

So does the soccer question have any real political significance?

Sport can be a factor as well as a reflection of national identity. Major sports events can capture or even help define the public mood for a time. Sports heroes, controversies and analogies can affect politics, and politics often surrounds sport, as with the Beijing Olympics. The ethnic nationalism often expressed in soccer also shapes South Korean views of the North, as well as South Korean views of how other countries relate to Pyongyang. But we should not read too much into South Korean allegiances in a hypothetical soccer match. How often do the U.S. and North Korean teams actually face each other on the pitch? A less hypothetical situation involves how South Koreans tend to root for whichever team is playing Japan. So perhaps a more interesting question – given recent events – would be the balance of South Korean support in a Japan vs. China match. It would also be interesting to see if South Koreans would be less supportive of the North Korean team if it started to outperform the South in international competition. Pan-Korean nationalism may be a powerful force among soccer fans, but I suspect South Korean nationalism is quite a bit stronger.

Isn’t there a tendency in South Korea to frame the nuclear standoff as a North Korea vs. U.S. issue? And don’t some South Koreans like to see the North stand up to America?

South Koreans know their government is not a spectator but an interested and involved actor in the nuclear standoff. While South Koreans are generally desensitized to North Korean threats and see outright war as improbable, they are still conscious that the situation can become one of life and death or involve potential shocks for the South Korean economy and taxpayer. There is little doubt that nuclear weapons are important to North Korean nationalism and a desire to stand up to the U.S. (and China, for that matter). Some South Koreans say that pursuing nuclear weapons makes sense for Pyongyang, given its external threat perceptions and how its conventional military forces are outmatched by those of South Korea and the U.S. But trying to understand or even justify North Korean behavior is not the same as supporting it. South Koreans are increasingly critical of the North since Pyongyang apparently tested two nuclear devices, cheated on the nonproliferation regime and Six-party Talks agreements, and attacked South Korea. The general sense in South Korea is that Pyongyang’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is a misuse of resources by a Kim family regime that antagonizes outsiders and traps the North Korean people in oppressive poverty.

Does this mean Americans do not have cause to worry about South Korean public opinion?

Sympathies among South Koreans for the North remain significant and important, and some historical suspicion and resentment of the U.S. endures. So it would be imprudent for Americans to interpret the Lee Myung-bak government’s very positive orientation toward the U.S. and relatively tough stance on North Korea as a consensus opinion. Future developments with the North, and especially within South Korea’s domestic politics, might produce a shift in foreign policy. A major lesson of the early 2000s was that the U.S. needs to better understand South Korean pride and ethnic nationalism. That lesson is being reflected in improvements in handling incidents involving U.S. forces in South Korea, care to avoid unilateral policies on North Korea, and calls for progress in relations between Seoul and Pyongyang before the U.S. seriously reengages with the North.

Has the sinking of South Korea’s Cheonan naval vessel and North Korea’s shelling of Yeonpyeong Island fundamentally changed South Korean views of the North?

Certainly those attacks hardened South Korean public opinion in the short-term. But it is yet unclear whether the Cheonan and Yeonpyeongdo incidents will affect South Korean opinions over the long-term as much as the June 15, 2000 North-South summit and the Sunshine Policy. Many Koreans are likely to view recent events as confirmation of what they already believe. Ultra-conservatives assert that North Korea’s regime is a threat and must be defeated; ultra-progressives assert that the Lee Myung-bak administration and the U.S. pushed North Korea into a corner and thus provoked violence. The young generation is more susceptible to recent events as formative experiences, but it is too soon to tell how Cheonanham and Yeonpyeongdo will shape their views.

We often hear that young South Koreans are focused on jobs and see the situation with North Korea as out of their hands. Do they tend to be aloof to Pyongyang’s provocations?

New survey-based research in South Korea suggests that the young generation cares about socio-economic issues more than the ideological divides of previous generations who experienced the Korean War and democratization. South Koreans in their 20s and 30s appear very pragmatic about North Korea and the U.S., focusing on how foreign relations affect their bottom line. One of the deepest regrets Koreans have about history is that their nation’s fate has often been determined by outside forces. It would be tragic for this to be perpetuated by mass indifference to national security and foreign policy. I do not think this will happen. Eventually, circumstances will change in North Korea – hopefully via peaceful transition rather than crisis – and I expect that South Korea, with U.S. support, will take the lead on the Korean Peninsula. With that future at stake, the next generation in South Korea will become more engaged. Meanwhile, Americans should not mind if South Koreans root for the North Korean soccer team; it is more important that South Korean foreign policy continues to root for the alliance with the United States.

Building Strategic Trust in Northeast Asia

Interview with Stanford's Northeast Asia History Fellow, Leif-Eric Easley
By Sarah Bhatia
Shorenstein APARC News, December 16, 2010

How do military allies come to find each other more dependable on security issues, instead of less comfortable with mutual reliance? How do rival nations manage to build confidence and shared expectations for a collaborative future, rather than fall into a spiral of suspicions over each other's strategic intentions?  Leif-Eric Easley, the 2010-11 Northeast Asian History Fellow at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC), addresses these key questions in his recently completed dissertation, Perceived National Identity Differences and Strategic Trust: Explaining Post Cold-War Security Relations Among China, Japan, South Korea, and the United States. Examining post-1992 Northeast Asia, and drawing from a broad range of source materials in four languages, Dr. Easley argues that differences in how the policymaking elite in two countries perceive the national identity of one another determines the level of strategic trust between their governments. This ultimately affects patterns of cooperation on national and international security matters.

With a background in both political science and mathematics, and paying close attention to historical issues in East Asia, Dr. Easley earned his Ph.D. in Government from Harvard University in 2010. While at Shorenstein APARC, he is revising his dissertation into a book and will teach a course about nationalism and security relations in Northeast Asia. In a recent interview, Dr. Easley discussed his research and future plans.

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What is one of the most interesting and timely case studies that you examined?

Japan and China have had a very difficult time improving the level of strategic trust between them. The reasons for this are numerous. There are, of course, the historical legacies of Japanese colonialism, the Pacific War, and indeed hundreds of years of disagreements between China and Japan.

Even though those were largely papered over in favor of normalizing relations in the 1970s and then building up an economic relationship—China is now Japan's largest trading partner—a lot of that historical baggage was not fully unpacked. The Chinese say there are a lot of things the Japanese have not apologized for. The Japanese say that Beijing tends to use anti-Japanese nationalism for its own domestic purposes. At various points of time in the post-Cold War era—whether it has to do with the way that textbooks are being revised or how the Japanese prime minister periodically pays homage to Japan's war dead at the Yasakuni Shrine—Chinese nationalism has found expression in anti-Japanese protests.

My argument is that such historical antagonisms, among other things, bring to light the perceptions of identity difference between the two sides. The more severe the perceptions of difference, the more of a gap that elites in one country see between their national identity and the national identity of the other side, and the less trust the two sides are going to have. So these historical issues really weigh down on the level of strategic trust between Tokyo and Beijing. This is problematic—not just for dealing with pressing hard security issues like North Korea or trying to advance regional security architectures like the ASEAN Regional Forum—but also because strategic trust is very important for facilitating cooperation and avoiding conflict. Without a decent measure of trust, you do not have much margin for error when some unforeseen things happen, such as the recent incident over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.

Based on your dissertation, what steps would you recommend for governments to build strategic trust?

A lot of work in both academic and policy circles has pointed to mechanisms like increasing exchanges and trying to cooperate on so-called "easy" issues to establish a pattern of cooperation. Meanwhile, politicians and diplomats tend to be concerned with different forms of political theater to produce positive headlines.

My theory suggests that if trust-building efforts do not actually change the deeply-held perceptions that each side maintains about the other's national identity, then you are not going to see a meaningful and lasting effect on the level of strategic trust. That is not to say that exchanges and trying to rack up points on easy issues is not worth doing or will not ultimately have some positive effect. But the sorts of events and actions that really change perceptions and then can allow for meaningful changes in strategic trust are those that help redefine the relationship or the way that one side looks at the other.

For example, if Japan were to have an entirely different memorial site where its leaders could remember and honor Japan's veterans, separate from a shrine that has a certain view of history associated with it that is very objectionable to its neighbors, this could be something that would help change perceptions. Contrast that to a carefully worded speech by a prime minister. Japan has actually apologized dozens of times and yet the problem is still there. Those apologies, as well-meaning as they may be, have not significantly changed identity perceptions and hence we do not see much improvement in strategic trust between Beijing and Tokyo.

Another example would be dealing with some of the recent maritime disputes. If the China-Japan relationship had more strategic trust, it might be able to encapsulate those issues and not let them derail the relationship. But this is not yet the case. Coming to a greater level of agreement about how to deal with economic zones and how to pursue joint development of underwater gas deposits could really do a lot to improve perceptions on both sides. This would ameliorate Japanese perceptions of an aggressive Chinese identity, and help resolve a hot-button nationalist issue between the two populations. Real improvement in identity perceptions, such that each side thinks better of the other's international role and national characteristics, would allow Japan and China to realize a more stable, trusting relationship.

What is the course that you will offer at Stanford and what approach will you take to teaching?

The course will be about nationalism and security relations in Northeast Asia. I am hoping to engage these issues with some fresh perspective. What I want to do is provide students with background on the different forms of nationalist conflict in Northeast Asia to help them understand where these historical legacies and identity frictions come from. These are really contemporarily relevant issues. I will ask students to write on a very specific topic—a nationalist issue of their choice—and develop not only their own analysis, but also some of their own suggestions. This is a lot to expect, but I anticipate that the students are going to be up to the challenge. The students will probably come from different fields—including political science, history, sociology, and Asian studies. I think that with their diverse backgrounds, they will benefit from the environment here at Shorenstein APARC.

Shorenstein APARC is really special among centers—nationally and even internationally—in the way that it brings together academic rigor, policy relevance, and policy experience. We have top-flight academics, and we also have very distinguished policymakers, who bring a wealth of experience to the table. With more exchange between the academic and the policymaking communities, both sides stand to benefit tremendously. Shorenstein APARC is one of the few places that is doing this, and doing it so well. 

Do you hope to work in academia or government, or serve in both fields?

I plan to pursue an academic career, but at the same time to produce research and publications with policy relevance. Teaching is incredibly important because there is more and more demand among students with interest in Asia, and increasing demand across sectors for people who have expertise in Asian history and political economics. Teaching is an opportunity, not only to help prepare the next generation of experts, but also to improve my research and writing through interaction with students. Likewise, being able to take a sabbatical to serve in an advisory role at the U.S. Department of State, the Pentagon, or National Security Council would be a great opportunity to have real-world impact on the incredibly pressing issues in U.S.-Asia relations. Policy work is also a chance to expand one's own skillset and basis of research. 

Take for example, Thomas Christensen of Princeton University and Victor Cha of Georgetown University. Both are strong academics, who publish in top academic journals and produce academic books. They also served in the State Department and National Security Council respectively. After making positive contributions on the policy side, they returned to their universities with firsthand knowledge of the complex relationship between theory and practice. I hope to one day have an opportunity for public service and then return to academia with experience that is of value to my research and of value to my students.

Strategic trust between Washington and Beijing

Yesterday, the New York Times published a letter I wrote regarding U.S.-China relations.

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Relations With China

Mark Landler and Sewell Chan identify recent factors of declining strategic trust between the United States and China (“White House Tries to Build United Front to Face China,” Oct. 26). But not all trend lines are negative.

American and Chinese officials demonstrate improved understanding of each other’s domestic politics of job creation and leadership transition. Each side is getting better at providing notice and explanation for decisions on sensitive issues (trade, currency, Tibet and Taiwan) to minimize disruption to bilateral relations.

The Obama administration knows that calling for a responsible China also means offering a seat at the table, and Beijing may at last recognize that suspending military-to-military relations is counterproductive.

Although national interests allow neither country to fully meet the requests of the other, both sides grasp the importance of keeping United States-China relations on the rails. Expect efforts at trust-building to increase with President Hu Jintao’s visit to Washington.

F-16s and Cross-Strait Relations

Today the Los Angeles Times published a letter I wrote regarding U.S.-China-Taiwan relations.

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Not sold on F-16 diplomacy

In recommending the United States leverage not selling F-16 jets to Taiwan for better U.S.-China-Taiwan relations, Professor Dennis V. Hickey overlooks three key points.

First, the U.S. has formally assured Taipei that Washington will not hold prior consultations with Beijing regarding arms sales to Taiwan.

Second, while it would be a significant and welcome gesture if China pulled back missiles currently aimed at Taiwan, the military reality is that Beijing could easily redeploy those missiles whenever it wanted.

Third, the U.S. has a legal commitment to Taiwan's defense because of a strategic interest in a stable balance across the Taiwan Strait.

For these reasons, the decision to sell F-16s to Taiwan should be based on consultations between Washington and Taipei, considering security and budgetary factors as well as diplomatic ones.

Beijing has the ability to positively influence the decision-making process – by willingly reducing its military posture toward Taiwan. Doing so could facilitate a landmark summit between the presidents of China and Taiwan, without the U.S. cutting deals that might hurt more than help.

Quoted in the Economist

Today the Economist quoted a journal article I co-authored with colleagues Tetsuo Kotani and Aki Mori on the foreign policy of the Democratic Party of Japan.

The DPJ and U.S.-Japan relations

Today Reuters quoted from an interview I did regarding the Japanese elections and U.S.-Japan relations.

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Easley: After the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) comes to power, the biggest change for U.S.-Japan relations will be the number of new faces on the Japanese side. Most of the governing and diplomatic experience in Japan is held by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). It will be important to build trust between officials and show that the U.S.-Japan alliance is not a U.S.-LDP alliance but rather a partnership built on shared national interests and values.

The DPJ government will likely shift some of Japan's diplomatic attention to its neighbors. Washington can encourage this on top of close coordination with Tokyo. If Japan is more trusted and active in Asia, that will be an asset to the U.S.-Japan alliance.

The U.S. should remain sensitive to political developments in Japan while keeping all channels open for cooperation. The DPJ has already toned down some of its campaign rhetoric. Given that it must now face the resource and logistical challenges of governing while representing Japan's national interests, the DPJ will want to keep the solid alliance with the U.S. Some DPJ members may want to revise the terms of the U.S.-Japan relationship, but domestic reforms and economic issues will be the priority as the DPJ tries to show progress to the Japanese public before next year's upper house election.

Balancing internal factions and setting policy priorities will be the immediate challenges for the DPJ as it transitions from an opposition party structure to a governing organization. The DPJ's fortunes will depend on how well it accomplishes administrative reform and leads Japan out of recession. The U.S. should be rooting for the DPJ to tackle Japan's economic structural and demographic issues as this will make Japan a more capable partner over the long-term.

Japan's Elections and Relations with the Two Koreas

Today the USC Korean Studies Institute published an interview I did regarding Japan's elections and relations with the two Koreas.

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Q: The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won enough seats in Japan's legislative election today to form the next government without the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) that has governed Japan for all but 11 months of the last 54 years. What are the general implications of this change in power?

Easley: The election results are testament to the Japanese public's frustration. The LDP was instrumental in realizing Japan's economic miracle and postwar security, but since the burst of Japan's economic bubble and the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, the LDP has struggled to adjust. The Japanese public has been dissatisfied with the pace of progress on various domestic issues, including economic growth and inequality, bureaucratic mismanagement, and coping with Japan's aging society. If the DPJ is able to effectively deal with Japan's domestic challenges, this can strengthen Japan economically and as a security partner, and that would be good news for Washington and Seoul. The trouble is that nearly all the governing experience in Japan and most of the personal relations with diplomats and officials of other countries is held by the LDP. This will put the new DPJ government under enormous pressure to make a good first impression with its Japanese voters, as well as with Japan's international partners.

Q: Japan's relations with South Korea and China have often been plagued by issues of history and memories of war. How will the DPJ handle these historical sensitivities?

Easley: The DPJ has long advocated that Japan seriously reflect on its history and show greater sensitivity to its neighbors' memories of the past. Toward this end, the DPJ may take a more conciliatory position on the content of history textbooks. Regarding Yasukuni Shrine, DPJ President Yukio Hatoyama has pledged not to visit the shrine and that as prime minister he will see that no members of his cabinet go either. The DPJ may pursue the construction of a secular war memorial for Japanese officials to visit instead of Yasukuni. Such gestures would almost certainly be appreciated by the Korean people and other Asian populations.

On the other hand, the DPJ does not sound flexible on Japan's maritime and territorial disputes with its neighbors, promising to remain firm on Japan's claims. Hatoyama has said that these issues [such as the Dokdo/Takeshima island dispute between Tokyo and Seoul] are difficult to resolve bilaterally because if one side is seen as giving concessions, a nationalist backlash would follow. So Hatoyama suggests that these disputes be resolved in the process of developing an "East Asian Community," along a path of regional integration similar to that traversed by the European Union. This sounds good in principle, but will prove very difficult in practice. Nonetheless, it is important to have big cooperative visions to help nations gradually overcome historical issues. In the short-term, a more realistic but still worthy goal for politicians and diplomats will be not allowing historical issues to derail relations or delay urgently needed cooperation on financial stability, human security and the environment.

Q: What about the implications of the election for Japan's policy toward North Korea?

Easley: Hatoyama has mentioned the possibility of restarting talks with North Korea. Much will depend on how the DPJ handles the issue of Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea decades ago. [Several abductees were returned to Japan; some are reported dead, others are still considered missing. The issue has complicated not only Japan's diplomacy with North Korea, but also Tokyo's ability to coordinate policy in the Six-party Talks]. The DPJ may want to focus on North Korea's nuclear program, missiles and potential political-economic instability, but can not appear soft on the abductions issue because of Japanese public opinion and the possibility that the LDP opposition might use the issue against the DPJ. The interaction between Tokyo and Seoul will also be key. The new DPJ government will need to closely coordinate with Seoul on North Korea, but it is also important for Seoul to reassure Tokyo. Japan in particular has legitimate concerns about North Korea's nuclear and missile programs. If South Korean President Lee Myung-bak's administration shows understanding of Tokyo's security concerns, this would facilitate U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral coordination, which in turn could encourage China to be increasingly helpful in pressing for North Korea's cooperation.

Q: What does the advent of a DPJ government mean for the Obama administration's Korea policy?

Easley: President Obama's team and relevant officials at the State Department are well aware of the complicated strategic geometry in dealing with North Korea. They know pushing too hard could spark a military conflict with North Korea or serious break with China [since Beijing wishes to avoid the collateral effects of a collapse of the North Korean regime]. On the other hand, the Obama administration recognizes that taking a soft line at this point would present credibility problems for U.S. alliances and the international nonproliferation regime and undo progress made to date in having the world hold North Korea accountable for its provocative actions. United Nations sanctions are a counter-proliferation device and punish North Korea's breech of its international commitments. In principle, the sanctions should not be eased just because North Korea is willing to talk. It is important to reengage North Korea diplomatically given the opportunity, but President Obama and President Lee said the pattern where North Korea raises tensions and then returns to talks seeking rewards must be broken. The new government in Tokyo will likely agree. The question now is whether Washington, Tokyo and Seoul, working together with Beijing, will stay on the same page to hold North Korea to account – demanding concrete actions from Pyongyang on disarmament in exchange for concrete improvements in economic and diplomatic relations.

Legacy of Kim Dae-jung

Today the USC Korean Studies Institute published an interview I did regarding the legacy of former South Korean president Kim Dae-jung.

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Q: Former South Korean President Kim Dae-jung died today at a hospital in Seoul, reportedly of heart failure and complications from pneumonia. He was 85 and remained engaged in politics until his death. How will he be remembered?

Leif-Eric Easley: Kim Dae-jung's administration helped stabilize the South Korean economy after the Asian Financial Crisis in the late 1990s. But he will be remembered most for contributions to South Korean democratization and for the "Sunshine Policy" which sought political reconciliation and economic integration with North Korea. It was for these efforts that Kim won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2000. His legacy was subsequently tarnished however, by revelations of political corruption involving his family and evidence that the landmark inter-Korean summit may have been "bought" via secret payments to Pyongyang. Kim's strategy of engaging North Korea, which was continued by his successor Roh Moo-hyun, was dealt a serious blow when North Korea tested a nuclear device in 2006 and over the years reneged on most agreements it made with Seoul. Nonetheless, former president Kim's efforts for democracy and North-South reconciliation have lasting effects and are a significant legacy.

Q: What does former president's Kim life say about South Korean politics?

Easley: A tremendous amount – the arc of Kim Dae-jung's life is closely tied to that of South Korean politics for the last five decades. It would be a gross over-simplification to only remember Kim Dae-jung as South Korea's president from 1998 to 2003. In the 1960s, Kim Dae-jung emerged on the national stage as President Park Chung-hee's archrival. The divide between these two men reflected and helped define the left-right divide in South Korean politics that persists to this day. Park was of the military and the South Korean elite; Kim was a product of and voice for the masses. Kim Dae-jung was a leading critic of Park Chung-hee's legitimacy (Park came to power in a military coup). Park jailed Kim as a political dissident and may have had him killed if not for U.S. intervention. Kim came from South Korea's southwest region, which has a strong rivalry with the southeast region, home to Park and other presidents. To their respective followers, Park embodied South Korea's rapid economic development while Kim embodied South Korea's democratization. Park was deeply suspicious of North Korea and wanted a strong South Korean military and economy to employ against it; Kim wanted to politically embrace North Korea and integrate the two economies as a step toward ultimately reunifying the Korean Peninsula.

Q: Mr. Kim's funeral will actually be the second this year for a South Korean leader?

Easley: Yes, and the death of a former president is a significant event in South Korea. The passing of former presidents Roh Moo-hyun and Kim Dae-jung this year will likely mark 2009 as the end of a political era for many South Koreans. But while former President Kim Dae-jung will long be a controversial figure in South Korean history, his death of natural causes at age 85 is much less controversial than former President Roh Moo-hyun's suicide three months ago. Former President Roh was the immediate predecessor of the current president, Lee Myung-bak, and was under investigation for corruption charges. Roh's untimely death prompted a public outpouring of sympathy for him and criticism for the current government and its policies. Former President Kim Dae-jung's passing will certainly prompt a period of national mourning, but does not come as such a shock to the Korean public as did former president Roh's suicide.

Q: What implications might D.J. Kim's passing have for North-South Korean relations?

Easley: Perhaps as former President Clinton's visit to Pyongyang provided 'face' for North Korea to adjust its tone toward the United States, public reflection of Kim Dae-jung's life may help provide the political packaging for a new South Korean attempt to talk with the North. While it is not realistic to expect a generous memorial for Kim to forge a grand compromise between South Korean conservatives and progressives on policy toward North Korea, Kim's passing may provide symbolic impetus for some form of reengagement with Pyongyang. Since coming to office last year, the current South Korean president has been rebuffed by Pyongyang as hawkish and disingenuous. But President Lee Myung-bak is making a renewed effort to engage North Korea based on reciprocity, offering humanitarian aid and economic assistance if both sides reduce conventional military deployments along their shared border and if North Korea recommits to dismantling its nuclear weapons program.

Q: Is there any sign that North Korea will respond in a constructive manner?

Easley: North Korea has sent condolences to the South and may ask to send a delegation to former president Kim Dae-jung's funeral. Pyongyang recently received a visit by Hyun Jeong-eun, the chairwoman of Hyundai Group, and released a Hyundai employee held for months on charges that he made inappropriate political statements while in North Korea. There is talk of restarting South Korean tourism to the Mt. Kumgang resort in North Korea and resuming inter-Korean family reunions. However, United Nations mandated sanctions on North Korea's nuclear and missile programs remain in place and are still only in the process of being implemented. Ultimately, you should expect Pyongyang to act according to its interpretation of its own interests. The regime of Kim Jong-il appears focused on securing a stable internal political succession and externally promoting North Korea as a nuclear weapons state. The coming months will be an important period for international efforts aimed at persuading North Korea that its open economic development and complete nuclear disarmament are in everyone's interests.